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Adding Context and Constraint to
Corpus Linguistics
Jeffrey W. Stempelt©
INTRODUCTION: CORPUS LINGUISTICS AS POTENTIAL AND
PITFALL
The segment of this Symposium from which this paper
emerges was titled "Alternatives to Corpus Linguistics."1
Notwithstanding the title of the panel,2 I continue to think that a
better title for the segment would have been "Supplements to
Corpus Linguistics." The corpus linguistics movement provides a
t Doris S. & Theodore B. Lee Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law,
University of Nevada Las Vegas. Thanks to Bill Boyd, Dan Hamilton, Ted Lee, David
McClure, Ann McGinley, Larry Solan, and Symposium participants, particularly to my
colleagues on the "Alternatives to Corpus Linguistics" panel. © 2020 Jeffrey W. Stempel.
1 See Symposium, Data-Driven Approaches to Legal Interpretation, 86 BROOK.
L. REV. 291 (2021) (Panel II: "Alternatives to Corpus Linguistics"). Although addressing
corpus linguistics in particular, this article's assessments are in my view equally
applicable to other forms of textual data analysis such as Word Vector and algorithms
designed to assess word meaning.
2 See generally Anya Bernstein, What Counts as Data?, 86 BROOK L. REV. 435
(2021) (arguing that corpus linguistics "reliably provides neither (1) evidence of ordinary
understandings [of words used in statutes] nor (2) evidence of ordinary use [of the language
uses in statues]" as "ordinary readers don't read statutes" in the way "they read novels and
newspapers or listen to shows." Corpus linguistics thus over-emphasizes individual words and
under-emphasizes the social force and effects of law); Shlomo Klapper, Mechanical Turk
Jurisprudence, 86 Brook. L. Rev. 291 (2021) (noting the limits of corpus linguistics, in
particular the "absence" problem of corpora failing to reflect particular terms that are logically
related to words in a legal document and emphasizing empirical limits of survey research
regarding word meaning); Kevin Tobia & John Mikhail, Two Types of Empirical Textualism,
86 Brook. L. Rev. 461 (2021) (using survey questions to determine lay concept of "because of'
causation and implications for assessing the different versions of textualism reflected in
majority and dissenting opinions in Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) finding
Title VII against job discrimination for gay and transgender persons); Stefan Th. Gries,
Corpus Linguistics and the Law: Extending the Field from a Statistical Perspective, 86 BROOK.
L. REV. 321(2021) (noting methodological complexity of corpus linguistics and its over-
simplification by judges and lawyers); Daniel Keller & Jesse Egbert, Hypothesis Testing
Ordinary Meaning, 86 BROOK L. REV. 489 (2021) (drawing distinction between high-
confidence and low-confidence corpus findings and proposing hypothesis testing method for
distinguishing); Stephen C. Mouritsen, Natural Language and Legal Interpretation, 86
BROOK L. REV. 533 (2021) (comparing corpus linguistics and survey research as means of
assessing language use and noting limitations of latter approach); Brian G. Slocum, Big Data
and Accuracy in Statutory Interpretation, 86 BROOK L. REV. 357 (2021) (distinguishing
between ordinary, communicative, and legal meaning and suggesting different data analysis
approaches for determining these different categories of meaning).
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promising tool for legal analysis and should not be replaced per se
with "alternatives." It should, however, be supplemented by
consideration of other interpretative factors and indicia of
meaning. In addition, the varying situational benefits of the
doctrine should be better appreciated. Potentially valuable in many
contexts, corpus linguistics may add little or nothing in others or
may even be misleading. And as critics have noted, if embraced as
an exclusive or fundamentalist tool for deciding cases, the corpus
linguistics methodology could have pernicious effects.3
Corpus linguistics4 standing alone is cabined by the same
limits and imperfections of textualism standing alone in that it
3 For criticisms of corpus linguistics as thus far applied to legal analysis, see,
e.g., Anya Bernstein, Legal Corpus Linguistics and the Half-Empirical Attitude, 106
CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) [hereinafter Bernstein, Half-Empirical Attitude];
John S. Ehrett, Against Corpus Linguistics, 108 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 50 (2019); Shlomo
Kapper, (Mis)Judging Ordinary Meaning?: Corpus Linguistics, the Frequency Fallacy,
and the Extension-Abstraction Distinction in "Ordinary Meaning" Textualism, 8 BRIT. J.
AM. LEGAL. STUD. 327 (2019); Kevin Tobia, Testing Ordinary Meaning, 134 HARV. L.
REV. 726 (2020); Evan C. Zoldan, Corpus Linguistics and the Dream of Objectivity, 50
SETON HALL L. REV. 401 (2019). Professor Bernstein is careful to distinguish the "corpus
linguistics in linguistics" from "corpus linguistics in the law," which is the target of her
criticism. See Bernstein, Half-Empirical Attitude, at 6-16.
4 In this small addition to a Symposium focusing largely on corpus linguistics,
it seems unnecessary to identify and explain the concept. But to clarify terminology,
when speaking of corpus linguistics, I refer to the school of thought that advocates
analysis of a large database reflecting language use and analysis of that database to aid
understanding and interpretation of words. Corpus linguistics seeks to examine a
massive number of writings to see how terms were used and with what frequency.
A leading corpus linguist, Douglas Biber, has identified four unifying
characteristics of the corpus approach:
1. it is empirical, analyzing the actual pattern of use in natural text;
2. it utilizes a large and principled collection of natural texts, known as a
"corpus," as the basis for analysis;
3. it makes extensive use of computers for analysis, using both automatic and
interactive techniques; and
4. it depends on both quantitative and qualitative analytical techniques.
Stephen C. Mouritsen, The Dictionary is Not a Fortress: Definitional Fallacies and a
Corpus-Based Approach to Plain Meaning, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1915, 1954 (2010) (citing
DOUGLAS BIBER ETAL., CORPUS LINGUISTICS: INVESTIGATING LANGUAGE STRUCTURE AND
USE 4 (1998)); see also Clark D. Cunningham, Foreword: Lawyers and Linguists
Collaborate in Using Corpus Linguistics to Produce New Insights Into Original Meaning,
36 GA. ST. U. L. REV. vi (2020) (describing corpus linguistics and summarizing articles
in symposium issue); Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary
Meaning, 127 YALE L.J. 788 (2018) (summarizing corpus linguistics and applying its
methodology to cases); Lawrence Solan & Tammy Gales, Corpus Linguistics as a Tool in
Legal Interpretation, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1311 (2017) (summarizing and critiquing corpus
linguistics). Several databases have been assembled containing millions or even billions
of entries from newspaper, books, periodicals, broadcast transcripts and the like. See
generally, e.g., Corpus of Historical American English, ENGLISH-CORPORA,
https://www.english-corpora.org/coha/ [https://perma.cc/2CAU-U9N5]; Corpus of
Contemporary American English, ENGLISH-CORPORA, https://www.english-
corpora.org/coca/ [https://perma.cc/99B2-4X4Z].
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could then present an unduly one-dimensional approach5 to
understanding and applying the language of legal documents6
such as constitutions, statutes, rules, regulations and contracts.7
To a large extent, my criticisms of and suggested use for corpus
linguistics reflect the larger, longer-running battle between
advocates of relatively restrictive textualism and proponents of
broader interpretative methodologies that consider a range of
data bearing on the meaning of a document.
Sound interpretation and construction requires that
context supplement text. The two factors are complimentary
rather than mutually exclusive. Although corpus linguistics may
improve textual analysis, it cannot eliminate the need for
contextual consideration. The additional data about word
meaning provided by corpus linguistics analysis should be
5 See Bernstein, Half-Empirical Attitude, supra note 3, at 15 ("[O]ne prominent
approach that vociferously rejects using pragmatics to evaluate meaning: textualism."); see
also id. at 15-17 (extending criticism of textualism fused with legal corpus linguistics, noting
that textualists vacillate between concern for lay understanding of term and specialist
understanding of terms); Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 4, at 865-79 (recognizing and
responding to criticisms of corpus linguistics approach); Solan & Gales, supra note 4, at 1320-
31 (sympathetic critique but criticism nonetheless).
e Because this is a law review article, I limit my analysis to legal documents,
which includes not only statutes-which along with the U.S. Constitution have received
the bulk of attention from corpus linguists and interpretative scholars but also
regulations (e.g., of a government agency or private organization), rules (e.g., of
procedure or governing use of a facility), and contract writings. The meaning of the text
of any document-and the document itself- can become disputed which in turn requires
interpretation of the words of the document and construction of the meaning and
application of the document, activities that in my view are improved by consideration of
context as well as text. On the distinction between "interpretation" and "construction,"
see Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon: Interpretation and Construction, LEGAL
THEORY BLOG (Feb. 8, 2009), https://lsolum.typepad.comllegaltheory/2009/02/legal-
theory-lexicon-interpretation-and-construction.html [https://perma.cc/HU92-2LV7]
Interpretation is the "activity of determining the linguistic meaning (or semantic
content) of a legal text" while construction is the "activity of translating the semantic
content of the text into legal rules"); see also Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-
Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMM. 95 (2010). I would add "or decisions" to
Professor Solum's definition of construction.
7 In this relatively short commentary, I will not reiterate at length the
criticisms of textualism, particularly the "new" textualism that eschews consideration of
extrinsic and contextual information even more than does the traditional "plain
meaning" approach to interpretation but instead merely note that I am largely in
agreement with the criticisms. See WILLIAM N. ESiKRIDGE, JR., ET AL. CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND REGULATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC
POLICY 496-525 (6th ed. 2020) (describing and distinguishing Plain Meaning approach
and New Textualism, with excerpted cases as illustrations).
The words used in legal documents are of course important in construing the
documents, but the interpretative process should not be restricted solely to a two-
dimensional focus on words divorced from other important considerations. As I hope this
commentary also reflects, I am not opposed to corpus linguistics and related textual
assessments through use of big data and empirical analysis. I am not even opposed to
layperson surveys regarding word meaning. I am, however, quite strongly opposed to
making any of these exclusive or controlling factors in determining documentary
meaning and dispute resolution.
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embraced and given careful consideration by interpreters-as
should contextual data. I leave it to the imperialistic agenda
entrepreneurs of the respective camps to argue about which
tools should be used in first resort or given primacy if they
suggest different meanings. My core point is that in a typical
case, all of these factors should be considered unless there are
logistical or veracity factors that point to the contrary.
Documents, be they statutes, regulations, contracts, all
emerge in the context of addressing a problem or objective (legal,
economic, social, political, commercial). However skilled the
drafters of these documents in choosing language, consideration
of contextual factors is likely to increase an interpreter's
understanding of the document and provide a scale for
measuring the accuracy of textual interpretation, even if that
textual interpretation is enriched by corpus linguistics or other
sophisticated analysis that extends beyond consulting
dictionaries or the armchair reaction of a single judge.8 In cases
where document text is not carefully drafted or is being applied
to situations not envisioned by the drafters, the case for
considering context becomes clearer.
In addition, even if one is a strict textualist, corpus linguistic
analysis may be an unproductive use of the interpreter's time. In
some cases, the meaning-at least facially or superficially-of a
word or provision is so indisputably clear that examination of a
database of current or historical use is unnecessary.9 In these types
8 See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION 85 (2006) ("overemphasis on text can lead courts astray" while
consideration of drafter intent and purpose along with text more likely to lead to correct
interpretation); HENRY M. HART JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge Jr. & Philip
P. Frickey eds., 1994) (publication of famous Hart & Sacks Legal Process teaching
materials advocating multi-factor approach to interpretation as more effective
approach); William N. Eskridge Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as
Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990) (determination of statutory meaning
improved by consideration of multiple factors and iteration of interpretation though
dialogue with other viewers of legislation).,
9 For example, where a legal document (constitution, statute, regulation, rule,
or contract) contains a provision involving age or date, there is (absent very unusual
circumstances such as confusion about applicable calendars) no doubt as to the content of
the texts. Even where the word used has some vagueness or ambiguity, what might be
termed "intrinsic context" associated with the term and even the slightest background
information may make textual meaning so clear that additional investigation is not
required or worth the expenditure of resources.
Consider, for example, the well-known thought experiment about textual
ambiguity: a "no vehicles in the park" sign. See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation
of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 607 (1958). The meaning of the sign is then
tested with hypotheticals illustrating the limits of language literalism such as a garbage
truck collecting from the park's waste receptacles, a bike, a trike, rollerblades and of course
a war memorial statue containing a replica of a Jeep. But if a park patron rolls through the
grounds in his new Tesla to minimize the distance traversed with his picnic basket, anyone
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of cases, discussed below, the interpretative task is not discernment
of word meaning but a judicial decision as to the manner in which
the words in question should be applied.
By "superficially" clear text, I refer to situations where
everyone is quite certain as to the ordinary meaning of the
word(s) in question but where there is substantial doubt that the
word was meant to be literally applied to the situation before the
court. So-called scrivener's errors belong in this category as
well.1O For purposes of this article, I am categorizing
codifications of positive law (e.g., statutes), private
communications (e.g., letters and emails), and agreements (e.g.,
contracts) as documents that courts may be required to interpret
and apply in the course resolving disputes.
In Part I, I discuss the reasons why corpus linguistics
should not be considered in isolation from contextual factors, as
the latter often illuminate meanings that cannot be found from
simply chronicling the usage of a given word. In Part II, I
demonstrate, through the lens of three Supreme Court cases, that
corpus linguistics does not aid interpretation when the words of a
statute or document are clear, but their application to the facts at
hand is not. My critique of corpus linguistics mirrors the larger,
long-running, and ongoing debate of the merits of a more textual
approach to interpretation that focuses almost exclusively on the
language of a legal document versus a more contextual approach
that construes legal documents not only in light of their language
but also in view of the background, motivation, context, and
purpose of the document as well as credible evidence of author
intent." I proudly admit to a preference for an eclectic approach
possessed of common intelligence and community values readily accepts that the sign's
prohibition "clearly" applies to the Tesla driver.
10 By a scrivener's error, I mean a mistake in translation between what was
meant by legislators (or regulators or contracting parties) or even what was enacted, and
the text recorded in the document. For example, if a statute was intended to have an
effective date of 2012 that was recorded as 2021, this transposition of numbers would be
a classic scrivener's error. Relatedly, but more subtly, a document may contain language
that is not erroneous per se but may misrepresent the intent of the drafters or clash with
prevailing legal norms if given literal enforcement.
For example, in the well-known case of United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84,
89 (1985), the statute provided that holders of mining leases must apply for renewal
"prior to December 31," an odd phrasing that may have been a misunderstanding
tantamount to scrivener's error and was at least inartful drafting casting doubt on
whether Congress intended to use this unusual deadline that could prove a trap for the
unwary. Nonetheless, the Court gave strict enforcement to the deadline, meaning that a
lease holder applying for renewal on December 31 had missed the deadline and lost its
leasing rights. See id at 93.
11 Regarding intent, the position of many textualists-and most courts-is that
the language of a legal document is the best evidence of drafter intent (regarding public
documents such as statutes or regulations) or party intent (in the case of private
documents such as leases, invoices, purchase agreements, retention letters, or the like).
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to interpretation that embraces not only textualism and data-
driven analysis such as corpus linguistics, but also considers
other interpretative indicia.12
Even if one rejects narrow textualism and favors wide-
ranging consideration of contextual information, corpus
linguistics should be appreciated as a significant advance in
textual interpretative methodology. Instead of giving a gut
reaction, soul searching, pulling the most convenient dictionary
from a nearby shelf, or batting around terms with law clerks,
court staff, or judicial colleagues (as well as listening to
arguments of counsel), a judge facing an interpretative question
can instead (or in addition) examine the way in which a word is
used by the public at large.
I. THE LIMITS OF CORPUS LINGUISTICS
A. Quality Control and Corpus Linguistics
Although lay word usage in non-legal settings cannot be a
talisman, neither should it be ignored if properly presented by
counsel. Judicial use of corpus linguistics data will ordinarily be
presented through counsel's own work (or that of its retained
experts) with relevant corpora. This will entail the procedural cost
of ensuring that this information is appropriately absorbed and
assessed by courts. Introduction of corpus linguistics information
raises evidentiary issues that currently appear under-assessed. At
a minimum, corpus linguistics work should proceed from a
foundation of admissibility that requires requisite expertise of the
user, sufficient comprehension by courts (and by opponents so that
due process is satisfied), transparency, replicability, and
justifiability. If corpus linguistics evidence is aptly introduced
See, e.g., United States v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940)(text of statute
generally the best evidence of congressional intent) ("There is, of course, no more
persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than the words by which the legislature
undertook to give expression to its wishes."); United States v. Missouri Pacific R. Co.,
278 U.S. 269, 278 (1929) (where language of statute is clear and its application does not
produce an absurd result or impracticable consequences, the text of the statute controls).
Even if this very optimistic view of the writing abilities of human beings (or, more
challenging yet, human beings working as a group) is largely correct, it cannot be correct
one-hundred percent of the time. Consequently, consideration of contextual factors is
likely to increase interpretative accuracy by supplementing the understanding of the
reader so long as readers are not affirmatively misled by context.
12 Examples of other indicia of meaning beyond documentary text include:
drafter and party intent; the document's purpose; public policy; the resulting impact of
alternative interpretations; legislative-judicial colloquy; precedent and reaction to
precedent; enforcement issues; changed circumstances, or; other factors reasonably
bearing on word meaning. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., INTERPRETING LAW:
A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTION (2016) (setting forth wide
array of these and factors bearing on statutory construction).
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through a sufficiently skilled expert witness, the evidentiary
foundation would appear properly established.
But if this database research is done by judges or staff sua
sponte without review by the parties, there is considerable danger
that it could be done poorly with no ready mechanism for catching
or correcting errors.13 Although one might excuse this on the
ground that corpus linguistics work is in the nature of legislative
facts rather than adjudicative facts, I find this view misplaced as
well as insufficiently concerned about the dangers posed when
courts make conclusions about the workings of the world
(legislative facts) without benefit of having a record or scrutiny by
advocates. One might regard hidden use of corpus linguistics as
the judicial equivalent of a juror improperly visiting a crime or
accident scene and conducting her own measurements and
physical assessments. This situation may be an inevitable part of
judging and may be no worse than judges and staff randomly
browsing dictionaries-but its propriety should at least be
considered according to the standards we use for assessing
evidence, including the receipt of other data in court.
To be properly applied, corpus linguistics data should
ordinarily require more vetting than what often accompanies
judicial reference to scientific literature or current events, which
are often treated as "legislative facts" that courts may decree
without much constraint. If corpus linguistics is used as part of
a textualist method that rejects consideration of evidence of
background, history, context, drafter intent, or purpose of the
document in question, it could become a catalyst for error rather
than understanding. At a minimum, a strictly textualist court
utilizing corpus linguistics analysis should insist on correct and
rigorous methodology and ensure that it is consistently applied.
B. A Big Dictionary Is Still Just a Dictionary
Dictionary use by courts has received significant scrutiny,
most of it critical.4 As is the case with corpus linguistics, I self-
identify as one who is not opposed to consideration of dictionaries as
13 See Daniel C. Tankersley, Comment, Beyond the Dictionary: Why Sua
Sponte Judicial Use of Corpus Linguistics is Not Appropriate for Statutory
Interpretation, 87 MISS. L.J. 641, 668 (2018).
14 See, e.g., James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Oasis or Mirage: The
Supreme Court's Thirst for Dictionaries in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras, 55 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 483, 483 (2013); Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey Kirchmeier, The Lexicon
Has Become a Fortress: The United States Supreme Court's Use of Dictionaries, 47 BUFF.
L. REV. 227, 232-33 (1999); Lawrence Solan, When Judges Use the Dictionary, 68 AM.
SPEECH 50, 50 (1993); Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the
Supreme Court, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275, 277 (1998).
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part of the interpretative process, but rather as someone who also
wants courts to consider additional means of analysis as standard
judicial operating procedure-regardless of whether text read in
isolation appears clear and unambiguous upon initial reading.15 Let
the dictionaries be pulled from the shelves, at least until the
definitions get repetitive or yield only diminishing research returns.
But let the dictionaries also be supplemented by other means of
analysis, both textual and non-textual and contextual.16
To the extent dictionaries are useful interpretative tools,
a really big, searchable dictionary would seem to be an even
better interpretative tool and an improvement in the state of the
art of word construction. Corpus linguistics, if done even
modestly well, meets this standard. It certainly helps reduce the
problem of selecting the apt dictionary to use when construing a
legal document. Instead of favoring Dictionary A (and citing it
in an opinion) over Dictionary B, the court can consider a wider
analysis of word usage. Although corpora are not literally
dictionaries, they have an important functional similarity in
that they contain not merely a few illustrations of word usage
but potentially thousands of examples.17
Calling this a state-of-the-art improvement may be a
mild overstatement. While the advantages of a large database of
language use (and contextual use at that)1s are clear, a
15 Even if wrong, I am at least consistent across the decades. See, e.g., Jeffrey W.
Stempel, Unmet Expectations: Undue Restriction of the Reasonable Expectations Approach
and the Misleading Mythology of Judicial Role, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 181, 279, 291-93 (1998)
(arguing that "objectively reasonable expectations" of both policyholder and insurer
regarding operation of insurance policies be consistently considered at the onset of policy
interpretation without a prerequisite finding of facial ambiguity of policy language); Jeffrey
W. Stempel, The Rehnquist Court, Statutory Interpretation, Inertial Burdens, and a
Misleading Version of Democracy, 22 U. TOL. L. REV. 583, 664, 671-72 (1991) (arguing that
when addressing difficult interpretative questions, courts should consider the relative
difficulty respective stakeholders would have in obtaining corrective legislation).
16 See James M. Fischer, Why Are Insurance Contracts Subject to Special Rules
of Interpretation? Text Versus Context, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 995, 1005-06 (1992) (supporting
contextual analysis of disputed insurance policy text). One minor quibble I have with
Professor Fischer's excellent article is its seeming premise that contextual factors are less
important-or at least less used by the judiciary-in non-insurance contract disputes. Id.
at 1030-32. At the risk of sounding tautological, there may be differences in judicial
receptiveness to contextual interpretative factors based on the context of the dispute itself
(e.g., consumer contract, business-to-business contract, lengthy, complex contract
documents vs. short, simple, plain language memorialization of an agreement,
sophisticated investor vs. poorly educated pensioner, presence of duress or undue influence,
etc.)-and these considerations may impact judicial approaches to document interpretation
far more than the subject matter of the contract (e.g., insurance vs. real estate vs. clothing
vs. software vs. investment funds); see also YONG QIANG HAN, POLICYHOLDER'S
REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS 1-6 (2016) (finding considerable use of reasonable
expectations concept in commercial contracts as well as regarding insurance policies).
17 See Mouritsen, supra note 4, at 1954-55.
18 Although I am concerned that corpus linguistics not become a monster "HAL
9000 meets Textual Literalism" conception, it should not be overlooked that a premise of
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computerized collection of word use may in some cases be less
informed then the context provided by dictionary authors
through the use of exemplary sentences and illustrations
commonly found with dictionary entries.19 It certainly can be less
informed than consideration by courts (through precedent) and
policymakers (through legislative history, background, and
purpose, as well as executive reaction and implementation).
Some degree of judicial discretion is still required in the form of
search guidance and dictionary selection and reliance.
In spite of the promise of corpus linguistics, there remain
other concerns. What if the database is not sufficiently broad? Or
if the search strategy yielding the empirical data is flawed? More
important, does the use of a large corpus simply substitute a
computer database for a shelf of dictionaries without addressing
the problems of excessive focus on documentary text?20
Even if corpus linguistics is nothing more than use of a
bigger dictionary with more examples of word usage, it still
provides a valuable contribution, particularly if combined with
other means of interpretative analysis. But if users of corpus
corpus linguistics analysis is looking at language in the context of use and not in the
strict isolation one finds with some dictionary definitions. See 2001: A SPACE ODYSSEY
(Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1968) (HAL 9000 supercomputer of high but literal artificial
intelligence refuses to follow instructions of human crew, killing one crewmember prior
to disabling by surviving crewmember). Having ventured this far down the contextual
road, corpus linguistics analysis should be willing to embrace contextual factors other
than the surrounding text of language.
19 The authors of a dictionary do more than merely assemble examples of word
use at random or based on frequency of use. They exercise editorial judgment in selecting
particularly helpful and clarifying examples. Even if reasonable editors might have some
disagreement over those selections, there nonetheless is substantial editorial and
analytic value added by the editors' expertise that goes beyond collection or tabulation.
20 See Bernstein, Half-Empirical Attitude, supra note 3, at 14-15 ("Most legal
corpus inquiries have used a few publicly available corpora. Particularly popular have
been several large corpora compiled by the legal corpus linguistics project at Brigham
Young University, whose law school has been a leading force in promoting the method.
These include the Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA) and the News on
the Web Corpus (NOW), as well as historical corpora like the Corpus of Historical
American English (COHA), and the Corpus of Founding Era American English (COFEA).
There are many other corpora out there-linguists have collected all sorts of texts and
recordings to study-but the Brigham Young ones are the legal corpus analysis
favorites ... . These corpora share an emphasis on size: each boasts of the sheer number
of words, often numbering in the billions, that they collect. Yet they are sometimes a bit
cavalier in their claims about what those billions of words can reasonably be seen to
offer. The COFEA, for instance, tells us that it contains 'documents from ordinary people
of the day,' but does not give the kinds of demographic information that would be crucial
to evaluating its range of representation of language in an era of low literacy, expensive
writing materials, and extreme opportunity disparity. Propertied White men and
enslaved Black women were both ordinary people of the day subject to founding era laws.
But given their different access to text production and preservation, the former are likely
to be over-represented, the latter under-represented in a contemporaneous corpus. This
does not make the corpus useless; but it does mean that 'ordinary people of the day' fails
to explain just what it is the corpus offers.").
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linguistics analysis are myopically focused (if one can be myopic
in looking at a database with millions of words) on documentary
text alone, or to the exclusion of other valuable indicia of word
meaning, the benefits of corpus linguistics are reduced.21 To the
extent corpus linguistics analysis becomes a closed universe
ousting consideration of other interpretative evidence, this
promising school of analysis could become an academy of harm.
C. Context Is Also "Data": Perhaps Better Data Than
Computerized Examination of Word Usage
Much as corpus linguistics represents a refined
improvement over traditional strict textual analysis, it does this
at some cost. By appearing to be-and in all likelihood actually
being-more reliable than an individual judge's internal
understanding of language or a dictionary definition, corpus
linguistics discourages judges from considering other indicia of
contract meaning. While this is of course true of textualism
itself, corpus linguistics arguably exacerbates the problem by
making a more convincing argument that one can have enough
data about word usage to decide cases without reference to other
indicia of meaning.
The notion is dangerous when dealing with corpus
linguistics just as it is dangerous when expressed by traditional
textualists who have long argued that if a document has "plain
meaning" and is not facially ambiguous, there is no need to
assess meaning by anything deeper than the parchment of the
document.22 To be sure, one's initial reading of a document is a
21 Others have at least implied this criticism or limitation of corpus linguistics.
See, e.g., Evan C. Zoldan, Corpus Linguistics and the Dream of Objectivity, 50 SETON
HALL L. REV. 401 (2019) (arguing that corpus linguistics analysis alone is insufficient for
accurate interpretative results); Lawrence B. Solum, Triangulating Public Meaning:
Corpus Linguistics, Immersion, and the Constitutional Record, 2017 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1621
(2017) (arguing that examination of constitutional history and background should be
deployed along with corpus linguistics to reach sounder interpretative results).
Prominent proponents of corpus linguistics analysis have defended it against assertions
that it is myopic or one dimensional. See, e.g., Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen,
The Corpus and the Critics, 88 U. CHI. L. REV. 275 (2021) (arguing that although corpus
linguistics focuses on textual meaning, the process inherently involves context as
reflected in use of terms contained in wide range of writings and accepting that corpus
linguistics analysis is not sole determinant of word meaning).
22 See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW 53-55 (2012)
(viewing interpretation as discerning meaning of document from its text according to
prevailing language conventions without reference to extrinsic evidence); ANTONIN SCALIA,
A MATIER OF INTERPRETATION 23-29 (1997) (textualist philosophy applies plain meaning
of words in statute without regard to legislative history or other extrinsic evidence, which
late Justice regarded as illegitimate inquiry in that only the text of the statute has legal
force); Frank Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains, 50 U. CH. L. REV. 533, 539-44 (1983) (if the
text of a statute is not sufficiently broad to encompass case at issue, courts should not use
legislative history or congressional purpose to expand reach of statutory text).
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data point: what one thinks upon first reading is of course
relevant to meaning. So are second (or third or . .. ) readings and
close scrutiny of punctuation and absorption of lists that may
have been glossed over during the initial reading. So are
dictionary definitions of the words used in a text. So are
examples of the word's usage in a variety of settings.
All of this is data-just as examinations of word meaning
in corpora produces data that frequently sheds light on word
meaning. But so is the contextual information surrounding a
document and its terms: the situation prompting the document;
the purpose of the document in light of the situation; interaction
of participants in the drafting; drafting records;
contemporaneous perception of the affect of the document, and
so on. Not only is this data, it is often powerful data that often
says a great deal about the meaning of a document.
But for reasons that have never been persuasive to me,
textualists tend to underweight, or in extreme cases, even ignore
all of this data unless there is facial ambiguity of the text.2
3 The
textualist preference is to make interpretive conclusions solely on
the reaction of a single reader (the judge) or small group of readers
(an appellate panel, judicial staff, perhaps arguments of counsel if
the judge remains sufficiently open-minded).24 Contextualists by
contrast take the view that a rational interpreter should
consistently be presumptively open to consideration of all
information relevant to the meaning of a document.5
Thus, while corpus linguistics is an advancement over
the traditional use of dictionary definitions alone, it could also
23 Some of this emerges from the textualist belief that where statutory text is clear,
it is illegitimate for judges to consider anything in addition to the law's text. See sources cited
supra note 22. These commentators also argue that one cannot reliably discern the specific
intent or general purpose of an enacting legislature. See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 22, at 29-
37. Others may accept the legitimacy of these sources but give them low saliency if they run
counter to the preferred construction of statutory text. See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note
22, at 56 ("purpose must be derived from the text, not from extrinsic sources such as legislative
history or an assumption about the legal drafter's desires").
24 In phrasing my description/criticism this way, I am arguing that traditional
textualists take a very narrow view of the apt audience or interpretative community for
determining textual meaning: essentially the judge (or other judges on a panel or en banc court)
and their law clerks, or others they might informally consult (the prospect of which in my view
would raise ex parte contact and consideration of extra-record evidence issues that are generally
ignored). By contrast, corpus linguistics textualist use an expanded universe for determining
word meaning is in my view an improvement on insularity and random dictionary consultation
despite the shortcomings of corpora as lay usage of words outside legal context.
25 See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation form
the Inside -An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part
I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901 (2013) (examining context from which statutes emerge and finding
this important to apt understanding of statutory text); Cathy Mijman, Ascertaining the
Meaning of Legislation - A Question of Context, 43 VICTORIA U. WELL. L. REV. 629 (200)
(finding consideration of context essential to sound interpretation); Eskridge & Frickey, supra
note 8, at 324 (advocating multi-factor approach to statutory interpretation).
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produce the unwise side effect of discouraging consideration of
context. To the extent that corpus linguists, like textualists,
resist (or even bar) consideration of other data about word and
document meaning, the method becomes a tainted tool.
Put another way, which is more likely to yield insight into
the meaning of a document: collecting examples of word use in
corpora or studying the background and development of the
document itself? Although corpus linguists will probably
disagree and strict textualists will undoubtedly disagree, it
seems compellingly logical to think that contextual data will in
most cases be more informative about documentary meaning
than data about how the terms in the document are used in the
popular press or popular culture.26
The additional data about word meaning provided by
corpus linguistics analysis should be embraced and given careful
consideration by interpreters. But so should contextual data.
Here, "data" mean the "little" data such as situation-specific
information about the impetus and objective of legislation (and
regulations, rules, contracts, or other written documents) as well
as the "big" data of statistics and corpora. My core point is that
in a typical case all of these factors should be considered unless
there are logistical or veracity factors that point to the contrary.
For example, if proffered information is unreliable (e.g.,
insufficient proof of purported drafting intent) or will consume
inordinate judicial resources to obtain or process, this may
justify judicial unwillingness to consider or search out the
information. But if not, context should be given a place at the
metaphorical interpretative table along with text.
1. Logistical and Cost-Benefit Concerns Surrounding
Corpus Linguistics and Contextual Evidence
One implicit myth of textualism is that it consumes fewer
judicial resources.27 The judge need only read the text and, if she
26 See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 8, at 383 (arguing for multi-factor
analysis as a means to better statutory interpretation.).
21 See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Talking Textualism, Practicing Pragmatism:
Rethinking The Supreme Court's Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 51 GA. L. REV.
121,131 (2016) (suggesting that textualism is more efficient than pragmatism or multi-
factor approaches to statutory interpretation because jurists are expert at parsing text
and "far more efficient" than multi-factor methods because "it focuses on the statute
alone"); See generally Robert M. Lawless, Legisprudence Through a Bankruptcy Lens: A
Study in the Supreme Court's Bankruptcy Cases, 47 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1 (1996)
(recognizing and refuting myth in the context of bankruptcy statutes); Nicholas S.
Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism: The "New" New Legal Process, 12 CARDOZo L. REV.
1597 (1991) (textualism is efficient because it avoids the need to process large volumes
of information and utilizes clear rules of word meaning).
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finds the text clear, render a decision. While this template for
almost instant justice may hold true in some cases (e.g., a rental
lease that promises payment in U.S. dollars on or before the first
of the month), there will be many cases where analysis "limited"
to text (and the information textualists consider acceptable for
consideration) does not necessarily lead to swifter, less
expensive final disposition than would broader consideration at
the outset of all information bearing on document meaning.
Once outside the realm of documents with indisputably
clear text (e.g., the U.S. Constitution's requirement that the
President be at least thirty-five years old28), courts are usually at
least consulting dictionaries, treatises and other secondary
sources, and of course are consulting precedent as well as canons
of construction, which involves the burden of taking time to
determine the applicable canons.29 This may not be as time
consuming as a searching review of the origins of the Sherman
Act,30 but neither is it something one does during a television
commercial break. Except in very clear cases, even a self-
consciously textualist court will need to devote substantial
resources to determining word meaning, which raises the
question of whether time is better spent on increased examination
of text via reading more cases, consulting more dictionaries or
conducting a corpus linguistics analysis rather than spending
time considering extrinsic evidence of meaning such as context,
background, history, drafter intent, document purpose, and
function of the text within the area of law in question.
Adding corpus linguistics to this textual inquiry-
although promising-comes at the cost of investing additional
judicial time in deciphering text. Even a quick breeze through the
Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA),-1 the Corpus
of Historical American English (COHA),32 or other corpora
28 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
29 I find it interesting that a "Bible" of textualists contains more than 50 canons of
construction. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS 69 (2012). For the textualist interested in using any of these canons (but not
extrinsic evidence), there remains the task of selecting among the many canons in the book,
some of which are in tension if not outright conflict. My favorite canonical clash, noted in Karl
Llwellyn's famous article more than 70 years ago, is the clash between the notion that statutes
in derogation of the common law should be strictly construed while remedial statutes should
be liberally construed. See Karl N. Llwellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and
the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395,401 (1950)).
By definition, remedial statutes change or "derogate" the common law. There is no way in
which both canons can be faithfully applied. Even if it is in denial, a court must choose
between the two canons or principles and decide whether it will give more support to
restraining legislation or applying it broadly.
30 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-38.




requires some time and thought, both in constructing the inquiry
and in assessing the results. A more serious "dive" into corpora
databases requires even more time. If this is done by the court
outside the view of the parties, this not only is what might be
termed "dead weight" judicial time,33 but also raises ethical
concerns in that the parties are not provided the opportunity to
check the court's methodology and cross-examine the results. The
risk that a court will err in determining facts or assessing
information in a vacuum have been recognized in cases involving
internet research by judges. The judge may obtain suspect
information that is never adequately vetted, or the judge may
misinterpret the research without correction from a law clerk,
counsel or the parties. Although interpretation of documentary
text is a matter of law, database research regarding resolution of
a disputed word on which a case may hinge is arguably akin to
sua sponte judicial investigation of adjudicative facts, both of
which may take place with some frequency.34
33 By this I mean, as discussed regarding the cost-benefit issues regarding.
extrinsic evidence, that sua sponte text research by the court from metaphorical square one
may often engulf the court in time-consuming search costs, just as sua sponte judicial
examination of legislative history or background imposes costs on the court. But if the court
is instead merely evaluating the information brought to it by counsel and the parties (be
the information textual or extrinsic to text), fewer judicial resources are expended. The
court must of course take the time to evaluate the competing submissions, which may
include significant time reading material brought to its attention. (One would not want a
supposedly neutral court to automatically accept one side's characterization of background
facts while reflexively rejecting the submissions of an opponent). But this will usually
require substantially less judicial time than if the court was required to first locate and
unearth contextual evidence of meaning as a precursor to weighing and assessing it.
3 See George L. Blum, Annotation, Allowable Judicial Internet Research, 44
A.L.R. 7th Art. 8, § 19 (2019); M. Cristina Martin, "Googling" Your Way to Justice: How
Judge Posner Was (Almost) Correct in His Use of Internet Research in Rowe v. Gibson,
11 SEVENTH CIR. REV. 1, 24, 29 (2015); Elizabeth G. Thornburg, The Curious Appellate
Judge: Ethical Limits on Independent Research, 28 REV. LITIG. 131, 132-42 (2008);
David H. Tennant & Laurie M. Seal, Judicial Ethics and the Internet: May Judges
Search the Internet in Evaluating and Deciding a Case?, 16 PRoF. LAw. 2, 2 (2005); see
also MODEL CODE of JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.9(c) (AM. BAR AsS'N 2020) (judge "shall
not investigate facts in a matter independently and shall consider only the evidence
presented and any facts that may properly be judicial noticed" pursuant to Fed. R.
Evid. 201 and state counterparts); ABA Comm. On Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility,
Formal Op. 478, at 7 (2017) (limiting boundaries of proper judicial research to general
background information to improve judge's understanding of subject matter of case
but barring research regarding particular facts of dispute); Coleen M. Barger, On the
Internet, Nobody Knows You're a Judge: Appellate Courts' Use of Internet Materials, 4
J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 417, 418-49 (2002) (cataloging citations to internet materials
in judicial opinions).
In chambers, review of real evidence or judicial visits to physical locations
pose similar risks. In addition, even if the raw information held by the judge is
essentially accurate, a judge insufficiently versed in statistics, science, or other
relevant fields may be a poor consumer of the information. See, e.g., Michael Saks,
Ignorance of Science is No Excuse, 10 TRIAL 18 (1974) (criticizing court's jury size cases
for failing to realize that the same sociological studies arguing against five-person
juries (found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court) made an equally compelling case
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Also overlooked in debate about the relative costs and
benefits of consideration of non-textual indications of meaning
is the role of the adversary system. Where American adversarial
litigation is functioning as it should, the parties and counsel are
incentivized to conduct research and investigation that will
support their positions and present this information to the court.
The court is not required to engage in historical archival
research rivaling that of a Ph.D. candidate, but rather need only
be willing to consider the information brought to it by counsel.
The logistical burden-at least on judges-of considering
context is consistently reduced by the adversary system.
American judges, unlike their counterparts in some systems, are
not charged with investigating claims and developing facts.
Although it has attracted criticism, the "umpire" metaphor used
so successfully by Justice John Roberts at his confirmation
hearings36 does accurately describe a key aspect of adjudication:
the court does not have to do the work of finding and presenting
evidence-that's the job of the parties.36 If the parties bring forth
against six-person juries). McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 32 (2002) (Court adopts as
settled fact that recidivism of sexual offenders drops from 80 percent to 15 percent
with treatment based on misreading of problematic article). Robert E. Freeman-Longo
& Ronald V. Wall, Changing a Lifetime of Sexual Crime, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Mar. 1968,
at 58; See also EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT: PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS
ON SCI & TECH., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS:
ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS 1-20 (2016)
(noting certain types of "evidence" widely admitted in court lack scientific rigor, using
bitemarks, firearms, and latent fingerprints as examples).
The issue is not easily resolved in balancing adversarial fairness and judicial
discretion. Some judicial initiative in investigating (through either legal or factual
research) issues underdeveloped by the parties can improve judicial decisionmaking.
Former Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner's opinions have been refreshing
illustrations and caution against an absolute bar to sua sponte judicial research. See,
e.g., Harbor Ins. Co. v. Cont'l Bank Corp., 922 F.2d 357, 362 (7th Cir. 1990) (applying
Illinois law) (conducting research regarding origin and meaning of term "mend the hold"
after being disappointed in counsel's failure to provide information).
6 The umpire analogy has been criticized as simplistic and misleading. See
Michael P. Allen, A Limited Defense of (at Least Some of) the Umpire Analogy, 32
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 525, 526 n.4 (2009) (noting the criticism conveyed against the
analogy); Richard A. Posner, The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First Century, 86 B.U.
L. REV. 1049, 1051 (2006) ("The formalist conception of judging crudely depicted by
Roberts is fancied up in versions intended for academic audiences. No serious person
thinks that the rules that judges in our system apply, particularly appellate judges and
most particularly the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, are given to them the way the
rules of baseball are given to umpires."). But it remains popular because it appears to
reflect the judges' perception of their role. See, e.g., BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT
ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 430 (1st Paperback ed. 2005) (in response to question as to
whether he preferred being a lawyer to a jurist, Justice Lewis Powell rhetorically asked
NFL star running back Larry Brown whether he would "rather be a player or a referee.").
3 See generally BAILEY KUKLIN & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, FOUNDATIONS OF THE
LAW: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY AND JUDICIAL PRIMER Ch. 5 (1994) (chapter on Law,
Dispute Resolution, and the Adversary System) (describing role of adversary system and
party-controlled, counsel-led presentation of evidence and argument); STEPHAN A.
LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE (1984) (same, with
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no extra-textual evidence that is, in the slang parlance of youth,
"on them," and they implicitly agree to live with the possible
consequence that a court will impose an adverse reading of text
that could have been avoided had the losing party bothered to
bring the contextual evidence to the court's attention.
Opponents of contextual evidence regarding documentary
meaning implicitly raise the logistical concern that consideration
of contextual evidence may require too great an expenditure of
judicial resources. Although this is not the primary pillar of
textualist arguments against consideration of contextual
information, it is a significant, if often unspoken brief for
concentrating on documentary text alone.37
The textualist implicitly posits that focusing on text
saves judicial time and energy by eliminating or reducing the
time required to unearth and assess contextual evidence of word
meaning.38 To the extent that corpus linguistics is seen as a
branch of textualism or an advancement upon traditional
textualism, it implicitly rides the same "wave" of conventional
wisdom that deciding document disputes based on text alone is
more efficient than decision-making that includes contextual
information and that this efficiency can be achieved at little or
no cost to accuracy.
This supposition may have a kernel of truth, but the
time-saving and net efficiency (which, if properly calculated,
should include the cost of erroneous decisions) supposedly
derived from restricting consideration of context appears
exaggerated due to the incentives of litigants to provide the
judge with strong evidence on their position, which necessarily
reduces judicial need for outside research. Nonetheless, the
prevailing mainstream approach to statutory construction and
contract interpretation implicitly accepts this supposition. If the
words of the document are clear on their face, the court decides
the case on this view of the text with no consideration of
additional material. Only if the court finds that the text is
facially ambiguous does it expressly consider contextual
information.39 Although there is significant jurisprudence to the
additional express praise for adversary system in unearthing evidence and sharpening
presentation of argument regarding dispute resolution).
37 See sources cited supra note 27.
38 See id.
39 See RESTATEMENT OFTHE LAW, LIABILITY INSURANCE § 3 (AM. LAW INST.
2019) (adopting plain meaning rule for construction of insurance policies but defining
broad category of information as acceptable for ascertaining plain meaning without
becoming consideration of "extrinsic" evidence); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §
7.10 (4th ed. 2004); JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 3.10 (7th ed. 2014) (discussing
"plain meaning rule and ambiguity" and noting that majority of course require facial
404 [Vol. 86:2
ADDING CONTEXT AND CONSTRAINT
contrary, particularly regarding contracts, the contrarian view
appears to be the in the minority.4"
Although much of this view is premised on the belief that
the text is "the" law or "the" contract and must rule unless
unclear, it is also a popular view for the often under-emphasized
and even unstated reason that it seems more efficient in that it
lightens the judicial task by reducing the amount of material
that is considered by the court.41
Regarding context and efficiency, a little perspective is in
order. Although consideration of context is not costless, neither is
it automatically more costly than restricting analysis to text alone.
Even strict textualism requires significant investment of judicial
time in examining materials in addition to the text in dispute: the
case record; the implicit case background; party submissions;
precedent; treatises and other secondary literature, and of course;
dictionaries. The idealized (from an efficiency standpoint) notion of
a court merely reading disputed text and deciding the question is a
mirage. Except in very "easy" cases, adequately performed textual
analysis will include at least a reasonable amount of time
consulting these sources of information. There is no guaranty that
this will involve less time than it would take to consult legislative
history or background information relevant to the origin and
understanding of the statute.
If corpus linguistics is added to the mix of textualist tasks,
this adds another bucket of information and the attendant ask of
analyzing the information. It may be a worthwhile expenditure of
time, but it remains an expenditure. The judge may avoid the
visible expense of holding hearings or a trial regarding extra-
textual material and remains in chambers focusing on documents
or, in the case of corpus linguistics, a database.
In that sense, the textualist enterprise-or at least the
judge-in-chambers-with-a-green-eyeshade version of it-has
kinship with the modern judicial preference for deciding cases
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) motions (which can hinge on whether the
textual ambiguity as prerequisite to consideration of extrinsic evidence). As reflected in
the discussion of Cont'l Can Co., infra notes 49-66 and accompanying text, textualists
may also resist contextual information out of concern that the contextual information
may be misleading or is in any event not "the law" or "the" contract.
4 See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442
P.2d 641, 645 (Cal. 1968); Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory of Insurance Policy
Interpretation, 95 MICH. L. REV. 531, 539-40 (1996) (treating the Thomas Drayage court's
openness to extrinsic evidence as the dominant approach).
41 It may also be a popular judicial view for the more disturbing legal realist
reason that it places fewer constraints on judges.
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judge finds allegations sufficiently "plausible")42 or summary
judgment motions (which hinge on whether the judge finds that a
purported dispute of fact is sufficiently "genuine" and "material").43
What may seem like a simple exercise of reading and deciding can
become something considerably more time-consuming.
In addition, if a reviewing court reads the contested
language differently, text-reading that is not verified by
consistent contextual factors may result in reversal and remand,
which restarts the adjudication cycle in a time-consuming
fashion."4 By contrast, the time invested at the outset in
contextual inquiry may be little more time-consuming than the
traditional textualist inquiry but may save more time in the long
run by reducing the number of appeals, reversals, and remands.
To be sure, the task of assessing contextual information,
like the task of assessing textual information, is not cost-free.
But the adversary system at least removes from the court the
burden of discovering contextual indicia of meaning. If
contextual information is to be heard by the court, it will be
because the parties gathered and presented the information, and
briefed its significance.45
The relevant cost-benefit question then becomes not
whether it takes time to assess contextual information, but
whether the additional consideration of contextual information
(in addition to the obviously required examination of disputed
text) consumes significantly more judicial time at the threshold
in a party-driven adversary system and whether that additional
time provides sufficient offsetting benefits through better
interpretation of documentary text that is less often reversed or
otherwise relitigated.46
42 See FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(6); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556
(2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); BROOKE D. COLEMAN ET AL.,
LEARNING CIv. PROC. 284-302 (3d ed. 2018).
4 See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 674.
" See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Taking Cognitive Illiberalism Seriously: Judicial
Humility, Aggregate Efficiency, and Acceptable Justice, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 627, 631-32
(2012) (explaining that summary judgment grants are frequently reversed on appeal where
an appellate panel disagrees with trial court about facts viewed as undisputed by the trial
court as well as in cases where reviewing court holds different view of applicable law.).
45 See sources cited supra note 36 (discussing adversary system role in U.S. litigation).
46 By "otherwise relitigated" I mean that a court's construction of disputed
documentary text may be challenged in means other than direct appeal. For example, there
may be no appellate or certiorari review of an interpretative decision but the decision, if
considered erroneous or problematic or lacking in sufficient guidance may continue to be
the subject of repeated challenge in other cases. By contrast, an interpretative decision that
makes persuasive use of contextual factors as well as sound textual analysis may become
sufficiently authoritative that it discourages re-litigation or streamlines later adjudication
by making pretrial disposition or settlement more likely.
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Regardless of one's views on the cost-benefit equation of
contextual information bearing on the meaning of text, there is no
denying that use of corpus linguistics analysis adds to the burden
of the textualist judge. By going beyond an initial "gut feeling"
reading or consultation with dictionaries, the judge considering
corpus linguistics evidence invests additional time processing
what could be a substantial amount of information and assessing
the associations found by the corpus linguistics inquiry.
At a minimum, this calls into question the efficiency of
textualist methodology relative to contextualist approaches as
well as the relative probative value of the differing approaches.
The corpus linguistics judge spends time on corpus linguistics
that could have been spent actually investigating the
surrounding circumstances of the dispute rather than exercising
a tunnel vision focus on text alone. The same time devoted
toward understanding an industry, party relations, the goal of
the arrangement, the negotiations, and the behaviors of the
parties, as well as the dispute itself could well lead to more
accurate resolution of disputes, perhaps in less time than is
required for constructing and assessing a corpus search.
But as is the case with contextual evidence, presentation of
corpus linguistics information takes place (or at least should take
place) through the adversary system. Although it may be too
extreme to bar judges from sua sponte corpus linguistics
investigation in chambers, it is preferable that such information be
presented to the court by the parties through use of expert analysis
and empirical evidence that is subject to cross-examination by
motivated parties armed with equivalent expertise.
If done in this manner, corpus linguistics analysis need not
be excessively time consuming and can produce greater insight into
documentary meaning. But the same is true for contextual
information, which suggests that both should be available for courts
in deciding cases and that the former should not be privileged over
the latter merely because it is more overtly word-related.
2. Veracity Concerns Regarding Contextual Evidence
Another oft-cited reason to avoid the use of context in
interpretation are veracity factors. By veracity factors, I mean
the concern that extra-textual information about documentary
meaning may be suspect. This can occur for any number of
reasons: self-interest of the source; faulty recollection;
incomplete records; other sorts of spoliation (e.g., deteriorating
real evidence). But the fact that some contextual evidence is
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unreliable or unpersuasive hardly justifies an absolute bar to the
use of contextual evidence.
Courts and the legal system are expressly designed to
separate reliable and probative information from suspect
information. They do this every day regarding important matters
of criminal and civil law. Just as a court (often with the assistance
of a jury) is trusted to determine guilt or innocence, the cause of an
injury, the amount of fair compensation, or the intent underlying
an action, the court is presumably competent to sort out the
"wheat" of contextual information probative of meaning from the
"chaff' of tainted, suspect, or misleading contextual information.
Consider legislative history, an important item of
contextual information surrounding statutory language.47
Contextualists consider both overall statutory purpose and
specific legislative intent important in discerning textual
meaning. But not all legislative history is created equal. For
example, although floor statements are part of the "official"
legislative history of a bill that becomes law, they have long been
regarded as less reliable than other types of legislative history,
such as committee reports or the joint statements of the bill co-
sponsors-descriptions and discussions of the legislation that go
beyond a single legislator and are subject to the discipline of
response from others on a committee, its staff, or other sponsors
of the bill.48 By contrast, a single legislator can say anything he
or she wants regarding a bill. No matter how inaccurate, the
statement is in the congressional record, even if the author did
not personally appear on the floor but merely submitted a
prepared text to the clerk of the relevant chamber.
Discerning courts recognize that such statements can be
used as "throwaway" gifts to a constituent or interest group and
may not accurately describe legislation. Perhaps ironically, a
good example of discerning differentiation of legislative history
is provided by a noted textualist: Judge Frank Easterbrook, in a
Seventh Circuit decision that rejected a construction of the
statute proffered by the party relying on a single senator's floor
47 See Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting
Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845 (1992) (defending frequent use of legislative history for
ascertainment of statutory meaning); Leigh Ann McDonald, The Role of Legislative
History in Statutory Interpretation: A New Era After the Resignation of Justice William
Brennan, 56 Mo. L. REV. 121 (1991) (reviewing jurisprudential debates between Justice
Brennan and Justice Scalia in Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 491 U.S. 440 (1989)
(finding that the ABA Judicial Evaluation Committee is not subject to Federal Advisory
Committee Act based on majority's consideration of legislative history versus dissent's
textual approach based on alleged plain meaning of term "utilized" in statute; noting the
importance of legislative history as an indicator of meaning for less textually fixated
judges such as the Court's moderate and liberal justices).
48 See infra text accompanying note 49 (discussing regarding Continental Can).
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statements (which post-dated enactment) in a case involving the
eligibility of a pension fund for favorable regulatory treatment.49
3. Judicial Weighing of Legislative History and
Context: The Continental Can Example
The Seventh Circuit considered the correct construction
of the term "substantially all" where the question was whether
that amount of contributions to the pension fund had come from
trucking operations. If so, the company was eligible for favorable
treatment in withdrawing from an underfunded pension fund
and would not make contributions to the fund as the price of
withdrawal.50 The Court accepted some proffered legislative
history but rejected other legislative history that it found not to
be probative because it appeared to represent only the attempt
of an individual senator to aid a supportive interest group.5 '
Because language is an exercise in shared understanding, one
Senator's idiosyncratic meaning does not count. This was the point of
the exchange between Alice and Humpty Dumpty. If everyone accepts
a new meaning for a word, then the language has changed; if one
speaker chooses a private meaning, we have babble rather than
communication.
The question then, is whether anyone other than Senator
Durenberger used "substantially all" to signify 50.1% rather than
85%. Nothing in the debates suggests that they did. Representative
Thompson's statement, the only one delivered on the floor in advance
of passage, shows that he at least (and likely the House) used the
phrase in the customary way [of meaning 85%]. Senator
Durenberger's two comments, inserted in the Congressional Record
after the fact, could not have influenced anyone in the House and
probably did not come to the attention of anyone in the Senate;
anyway it was too late. Efforts of this kind to change the meaning of
a text without bothering to change the text itself demonstrate why the
4 See Cont'l Can Co. v. Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers & Warehouse Workers
Union Pension Fund, 916 F.2d 1154, 1156 (7th Cir. 1990). The panel consisted of not only
Judge Easterbrook, who wrote the opinion, but also Judges Joel Flaum and Michael Kanne.
60 See id. at 1155, 1159.
61 See id. at 1156-60. The Fund argued that "substantially all" meant 85 percent,
and an arbitrator initially deciding the dispute agreed, based on not only construction of
the words but almost uncontradicted legislative history suggesting that Congress thought
85% was the correct numerical operationalization of the verbal term. See id. at 1155-57.
Continental Can, which wished to stop paying and leave the pension fund since it had
largely left the trucking business, argued that it was eligible to withdraw if a majority of
the fund was composed of contributions from trucker employment. See id. at 1155. In other
words, Continental Can argued, as the Court put it, that "50.1 percent" is the meaning of
"substantially all," and cited as support the floor statements of a single U.S. Senator, David
Durenberger (R-MN). See id. at 1155. 1157; see also John F. Manning, Second-Generation
Textualism, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1287, 1309 n.99 (2010) (describing Continental Can as a case
in which the court revealed "how the Senate sponsor of a piece of legislation sought to use
legislative history to manipulate its meaning").
4092021]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
use of legislative history has come under such vigorous attack, even
by former Senators.5 2
As the Continental Can decision illustrates, courts are
(notwithstanding Judge Easterbrook's jab at legislative history
generally) perfectly capable of distinguishing probative
legislative history from the efforts of particular legislators or
interest groups to "salt" or "plant" in legislative materials
attempts to expand, contract, or even contradict the overall
legislative purpose and specific intent of a bill. Floor statements
in particular have been identified as a type of potentially
misleading low-value legislative history.63 But even floor
statements may have significant probative value. For example,
a statement by a bill's sponsor in response to a query or criticism
regarding the bill at the outset of floor debate may (unlike the
postenactment solidary views of a single senator in Continental
Can) be quite informative regarding congressional
understanding of a bill and expectations as to its application.54
Textualists often seize upon the potential pitfalls of
legislative history as grounds for limiting or perhaps even
spurning its use. Indeed, in Continental Can itself, Judge
Easterbrook makes an eloquent textualist case66-but in the end
considers legislative history to resolve the meaning of the term
"substantially all,"56 despite some criticism from another
52 See Cont7 Can Co., 916 F.2d at 1158.
53 See id. at 1160 (Flaum, J., concurring) (labeling "post-enactment statements"
as a "particularly disfavored form of legislative 'history" (citing Pierce v. Underwood, 487
U.S. 552, 566-68 (1988); United States. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 281-
82 (1947); United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1318-19 (7th Cir. 1990)).
54 For example, recent congressional activity has involved Democratic attempts
to enact a higher minimum wage, with Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt) a prominent proponent
of the effort and maker of an unsuccessful motion to include the topic in the budget
reconciliation process that was largely centered on the Biden Administration's proposal for
a $1.9 trillion rescue plan for maintaining/spurring the economy despite the COVID-19
pandemic. See Alexander Bolton, Senate Rejects Sanders $15 Minimum Wage Hike, THE
HILL (Mar. 5, 2021), https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/541826-senate-rejects-sanders-
15-minimum-wage-hike [https://perma.cc/FN2C-L27D]. In evaluating any passage or
rejection of such proposals, a floor statement by Senator Sanders or other prominent
advocates logically has probative value, even if it may need to be read by with some caution
and concern about posturing or self-serving statements. The same would be true of floor
statements by prominent Republic opponents of the bill such as Sen. Mitch McConnell (R-
Ky.). If the legislation had passed consideration of such floor statements should at least
merit judicial consideration rather than reflexive rejection merely because this information
about legislative intent and purpose is not embodied in the statutory language itself.
55 See Cont'l Can Co., 916 F.2d at 1157 ("The text of the statute, and not the
private intent of the legislators, is the law. Only the text survived the complex process
for proposing, amending, adopting, and obtaining the President's signature (or two-
thirds of each house). It is easy to announce intents and hard to enact laws; the
Constitution gives force only to what is enacted.").
56 See id. at 1158 ("[T]he text is law and legislative intent a clue to the meaning
of the text, rather than text being a clue to legislative intent." (citing In re Sinclair, 870
F.2d 1340 (7th Cir. 1989)).
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panelist.67 As one textualist scholar summarized, although
courts recognize that "legislative history has .its problems and
must be approached with caution" they also appear to accept
that "no one has made the case for the inherent unreliability of
such materials in all contexts."fi
In short, legislative history is "data" that should be part
of any conversation about data-driven interpretation. So is other
contextual information that may credibly bear on word meaning.
When considering words in private documents such as contracts,
the case for context is even stronger because contracts are
isolated agreements and not universal positive law. Contracting
parties are making an agreement that is commonly
memorialized in writing but the writing itself is not "the"
contract 9 in the same manner that statutory text is "the" law.
In assessing the utility of corpus linguistics data relative
to other data, one might look to cases like Continental Can and
ask what types of data are most illuminating as to word
meaning.60 A corpus linguistics examination of what people
mean when they use words like "substantially" or "substantially
all" could be illuminating and almost certainly provides valuable
information beyond what one gleans merely from reading a
dictionary entry. But is such information any more illuminating
than looking at legislative history?
The Continental Can court that spurned the implications
of a postenactment floor statement also placed significant
weight on one sponsor's pre-enactment operational definition
(treating eighty-five percent as "substantially all")61 that enjoyed
analogous support in other areas of regulation.2 This portion of
Continental Can illustrates another arguable shortcoming of
67 See id. at 1160 (Flaum, J., concurring) ("I write separately because of my
reluctance to join what, with all due respect, I view as an unnecessary excursion into
areas of legislative motive and functioning.").
55 See Manning, supra note 51, at 1308.
9 See DAVID EPSTEIN ET AL., MAKING AND DOING DEALS: CONTRACTS IN CONTEXT 12
(5th ed. 2018) ("People think of. . .a piece of paper as being a 'contract.' But the piece of paper is
not a 'contract.'. . .At most, the piece of paper is a memorialization of the 'contract' .... ").
69 See generally Cont'l Can Co., 916 F.2d 1154.
61 See id. at 1156 (quoting statement by House floor manager Representative
Thompson that "substantially all" is intended to mean 85% and noting "our intent that, as used
in this special trucking industry withdrawal liability rule, the substantially all requirement
would only be satisfied where at least 85 percent of the contributions to the plan are made by
employers who are primarily engaged in the specified industries" (citing 126 CONG. REC. 23040
(Aug. 25, 1980) and noting unanimous passage of H.R. 3904 that same day).
62 See id. at 1158 ('"Substantially all' may have a special meaning. Statutes
contain words of art, whose meaning may appear strange to a lay reader. 'Substantially
all' is one of those phrases with a special legal meaning. Congress uses it all the time in
tax statutes, and the Internal Revenue Service decodes it as meaning 85%. Here are a
few examples [listing ten]." (internal citations omitted)).
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corpus linguistics: the most prominent corpora, such as COCA,63
collect popular or layperson usage of language. Although this
may be apt for statutes of general applicability such as criminal
law prohibitions on conduct or contract language between
generalist merchants, it may be misleading if the document
under review is one using technical or specialized language. In
deciding Continental Can, for example, it might have been
helpful for the court to have at its disposal a corpus of
congressional or governmental or regulatory use of terms.
Arguably, the court achieved the same effect by looking at
contextual data (taxation usage of the term "substantially all")
that informed Congress as it enacted the statute.6 4
If, at the time of the decision (1990),66 Judges Easterbrook,
Flaum, and Kanne had access to the COCA and modern computing
capacity,66 should they have ignored the legislative history in favor
of a corpus linguistics analysis? I think not. Further, although it
would be interesting to conduct such an analysis, I would hope that
courts would not be too quick to privilege corpus linguistics
analysis over legislative history. Although the broader collective
examples of usage offered by corpus linguistics can be helpful, I am
skeptical that the casual use of a term by laypersons could be more
informative about a statute than data directly pertaining to
enactment of the statute by its authors and the enacting body. In
sum, corpus linguistics analysis provides a useful and emerging
tool in statutory interpretation.
In sum, corpus linguistics analysis provides a useful and
emerging tool in statutory interpretation. Nevertheless, as
demonstrated above, consideration of contextual factors should
not be displaced by this data-driven approach, unless there are
strong reasons to do so.
II. THE CONTOURS OF CORPUS LINGUISTICS: A TYPOLOGY
Corpus linguistics can be a valuable tool for discerning
the meaning of words in dispute and can be particularly valuable
where words are facially unclear and there is little or no reliable
contextual information that illuminates meaning. But in other
cases, corpus linguistics may not be a useful tool. Sometimes the
terminology of disputed documentary language is clear-at least
as a general matter-upon a mere reading of the term. In such
63 See Corpus of Contemporary American English, supra note 4.
6 See Cont'l Can Co., 916 F.2d at 1158.
6 See id. at 1154.
6 See Corpus of Contemporary American English, supra note 4; see also Corpus
of Historical American English, supra note 4.
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cases, the task is not one traditionally regarded as
"interpretation" (what do the words mean) but of "construction"
(what legal effect will be given to the words and the documentary
language as a whole). This section provides examples of these
differing situations.
A. Clear Language But An Unclear Path to Decision May
Mean Corpus Linguistics Can Contribute Little to
Judicial Resolution
1. Assessing the Permissibility of "Snap" Removal
Judicial reaction to the practice of "snap" removal
presents a dispute where the meaning of a word in a statute is
literally or superficially clear, without any need for corpus
linguistics analysis, but where it is not at all clear-to roughly
half the judges that have considered the matter-whether the
clear text should be taken literally in light of the history,
purpose, and operation of the statute in question.
The term "snap" removal is derived by analogy to
defendants that quickly wrest a case away from the state court
in which it was filed by seeking removal before a defendant that
is a citizen of the forum state is served with process.67 Removal
on the basis of diversity jurisdiction is subject to a limitation
known as the "forum defendant" rule. If any defendant "properly
joined and served" is a citizen of the state in which the action
was brought, then the case may not be removed even though the
requirements for diversity jurisdiction are met.68
In the last decade or so, defendants have increasingly
deployed the tactic of removing a case before a forum defendant
has been served as a means of avoiding the forum defendant
limitation on removal. Entities that are frequent defendants
have begun electronically monitoring state-court dockets. When
they identify cases that qualify for diversity jurisdiction-but for
which removal would be barred because of the presence of a
forum defendant (i.e., a defendant that is a citizen of the forum
state)-they immediately remove the case before the plaintiff
has a chance to serve the forum defendant. These defendants
justify this removal even though it is inconsistent with the long-
standing forum defendant rule by pointing to the plain language
67 Examining the Use of "Snap" Removals to Circumvent the Forum Defendant
Rule Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 2 (2019) (statement of James E. Pfander, Professor,
Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law).
68 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) (emphasis added).
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of § 1441(b)(2), arguing that removal is not blocked unless and
until the forum defendant is served.69
The district courts have split on whether this tactic is
permitted. Slightly more than half of the district courts that have
addressed the issue have held that snap removal is not valid and
have remanded to state court.70 They generally view the practice as
contrary to Congress's likely intent as well as to the overall
structure of removal jurisdiction. They argue that Congress could
not possibly have intended for snap removal to be part of the
removal scheme, in part because Congress could not possibly have
foreseen electronic docket-monitoring, but more fundamentally
because one struggles to identify a policy justification for not
applying the forum-defendant bar just because a defendant
manages to remove before the process server finds its mark.71
A nearly equal number of district courts have upheld the
practice as permitted by the plain language of the statute.72 The
three Court of Appeals decisions that directly address snap
removal upheld it on plain language grounds.73 The original
removal provision did not include the "properly joined and served"
limitation, which Congress included in Title 28 in 1948 during a
significant revision of the statutory removal provisions.74 At that
time, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) was amended to its current language,
which states that cases qualifying for diversity jurisdiction (and
hence meeting the statutory requirement that original
jurisdiction exist) "may not be removed if any of the parties in
interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of
the State in which such action is brought."76
There appears to be consensus that the "properly joined and
served" language of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) was added to prevent
69 See PFANDER, supra note 67.
70 See Thomas 0. Main et al., The Elastics of Snap Removal: An Empirical Case
Study of Textualism 69 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 289, 306-12, (2021) ((manuscript at 6) (empirical
examination of decisions regarding snap removal and remand; finding slight majority of trial
courts remanded cases that were snap removed prior to service on forum defendant); Jeffrey W.
Stempel et al., Snap Removal: Concept; Cause; Cacophony; and Cure, 73 BAYLOR L. REV. 423,
446-49 (2020)) (reviewing development of snap removal tactic); see also Little v. Wyndham
Worldwide Operations, Inc., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1215, 1221-23 (M.D. Tenn. 2017).
71 See Main et al., supra note 54, at 8-9; Stempel et al., supra note 70.
72 See Main et al., supra note 54, at 15; see, e.g., D.C. ex rel. Cheatham v. Abbott
Labs., Inc., 323 F. Supp. 3d 991, 996-97 (N.D. Ill. 2018). ("Courts must give effect to the
clear meaning of statutes as written. Thus, where possible, we begin and end our inquiry
with the text, giving each words its ordinary, contemporary, common meaning." (internal
citations and quotations omitted)).
73 See Texas Brine Co. v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n 955 F.3d 482, 486 (5th Cir.
2020); Gibbons v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 919 F.3d 699, 705 (2d Cir. 2019); Encompass
Ins. Co. v. Stone Mansion Rest., Inc., 902 F.3d 147, 153 (3d Cir. 2018).
74 Arthur Hellman et al., Neutralizing the Stratagem of "Snap Removal": A
Proposed Amendment to the Judicial Code, 9 FED. CTS. L. REV. 103, 108 (2016).
75 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) (emphasis added).
414 [Vol. 86:2
ADDING CONTEXT AND CONSTRAINT
the abuse of the forum defendant rule76 by improper or "fraudulent
joinder" of a forum citizen defendant that was not seriously being
pursued by the plaintiff but was only named in the suit to thwart
removal.77 However, the published legislative history regarding the
1948 changes is inconclusive. For example, there is neither a
specific statement from Congress nor from the Advisory Committee
on Revision of the Judicial Code (the Committee), regarding the
addition of the "properly joined and served" language.78
76 See Hellman et al., supra note 74. The basic purpose of the 1948 "and served"
language is agreed upon by commentators although they may differ in their views of the
propriety of snap removal. See, e.g., Valerie M. Nannery, Closing the Snap Removal
Loophole, 86 U. CINCINNATI. L. REV. 541, 547-48, 585 (2018) (finding snap removal
invalid in light of overall diversity jurisdiction and forum defendant rule regime;
criticizing literal reading of "and served" language in statute); Saurabh Vishnubhakat,
Pre-Service Removal in the Forum Defendant's Arsenal, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 147, 163 (2011)
(finding snap removal appropriate because of plain language of "and served" requirement
despite tension with purpose of the language); Matthew Curry, Note, Plaintiff's Motion
to Remand Denied: Arguing for Pres-Service Removal under the Plain Language of the
Forum-Defendant Rule, 58 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 907, 931-32 (2010) (same); Jordan Bailey,
Comment, Giving State Courts the Ol' Slip: Should a Defendant Be Allowed to Remove
an Otherwise Irremovable Case to Federal Court Solely Because Removal Was Made
Before Any Defendant is Served?, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 181, 214 (2009) (criticizing snap
removal as inconsistent with overall structure of removal and diversity jurisdiction).
This appears to be the judicial consensus as well, even for judges permitting snap
removal. See, e.g., Holmstrom v. Harad, No. 05 C 2714, 2005 WL 1950672, at *2 (N.D.
Ill. Aug. 11, 2005); Brown v. Organon Int'l, Inc., No. 07-3092 (HAA), 2008 WL 2833294,
at *4-5 (D. N.J. July 21, 2008); Brown v. Organon USA, Inc., No. Civ. A. 07-3092(HAA),
2008 WL 2625355, at *7 (D. N.J. June 27, 2008); Allen v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, No. 07-
5045, 2008 WL 2247067, at *6 (E.D. Pa. May 30, 2008); DeAngelo-Shuayto v. Organon
USA, Inc., No. 07-2923(SRC), 2007 WL 4365311, at *5 (D. N.J. Dec. 12, 2007); In re
Aredia & Zometa Products Liab. Litig., No. 3:06-MD-1760, 2007 VL 2905247, at *2 (M.D.
Tenn. Oct. 3, 2007); Stan Winston Creatures, Inc. v. Toys "R" US, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 2d
177, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); see also John P. Lavelle, Jr. & Erin E. Kepplinger, Removal
Prior to Service: A New Wrinkle or a Dead End?, 75 DEF. COUNSEL J. 177, 177-80 (2008)
(defense lawyer attracted to snap removal as a tactic recognizes split in opinion and
tension between "and served" text and its purpose of preventing plaintiff gamesmanship
without vitiating forum defendant rule resulting in divided trial court decisions).
77 See Nannery, supra note76, at 548 ("[H]istorical context makes [the service
language's] purpose evident: The purpose behind the addition of that language seems fairly
clear-to bring into the statute the 'fraudulent joinder' doctrine and to restrict other tactics,
like failing to serve a properly joined in-state defendant, which might otherwise be used to
prevent removals which Congress had authorized." (quoting Champion Chrysler Plymouth v.
Dimension Serv. Corp., No. 2:17-cv-130, 2017 WL 726943, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 24, 2017)).
The fraudulent joinder doctrine holds that defendants against whom the
plaintiff has no plausible claim will be ignored in determining whether there exists
complete diversity and corresponding federal diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332. See In re Briscoe, 448 F.3d 201, 216 (3d Cir. 2006). But see Abels v. State Farm
Fire & Cas. Co., 770 F.2d 26, 32 (3d Cir. 1985) (plaintiffs motive of joining forum
defendant to defeat diversity jurisdiction is not fraudulent joinder unless plaintiff lacks
legitimate basis for claim against forum defendant). See generally James E. Pfander,
Forum Shopping and the Infrastructure of Federalism, 17 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV.
355 (2008) (defending forum shopping against common criticisms and noting that
practice may enhance federalism and relative importance of state judicial systems).
78 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1948); H.R. Rep. No. 80-308 (1947), as reprinted in
1948 U.S.C.C.S., Special Pamphlet: Title 28 at 1692; S. Rep. No. 80-1559 (1948), as
reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.S. Special Pamphlet: Title 28, 1675; Letter from Hon. Albert
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Notwithstanding that the circuit court scorecard
currently weighs in favor of snap removal, the practice is highly
problematic, inconsistent with traditional notions of federalism
and federal jurisdiction, and appears not to have been intended
by Congress.79 But regardless of whether the tactic is permitted
by the removal statute, corpus linguistics is not useful in
resolving the issue. The problematic words in the statute-
"joined and served"-are not ambiguous. Any lawyer reading the
words knows what "service" means, what is entailed, and the
litigation significance of the word. The question is not one of
word meaning but of what effect to give the word in light of other
facts relevant to statutory construction.
Unsurprisingly, strict textualists merely apply the
unambiguous word unless they view the result as "absurd,"
while contextualists are inclined not to permit a litigation tactic
that is consistent with the bare language of the statute but
completely inconsistent with the remainder of removal
jurisprudence, which has long construed removal requirements
narrowly in order to preserve the concept of the limited
jurisdiction of federal courts.80 Textualist and contextualists can
debate at length with corpus linguistics providing no support-
indeed no relevant evidence-to either side.
2. Documentary Deadlines as Another Example of Non-
Utility for Corpus Linguistics
United States v. Locke1 provides another example of the
type of case where corpus linguistics appears to be of limited or
no utility. The case concerned the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act,82 which provided that holders of certain mining
claims involving federal land are required to file certain
documents "prior to December 31" in order to renew their right to
mine on federal land.83 The Supreme Court applied this language
literally and disallowed a renewal submission filed on December
31,84 giving substantial bite to this "quintessential trap for the
unwary," enforcing a deadline where "it seems wholly illogical to
B. Maris, Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and Chair
of the Committee, to Mildrim Thompson, Jr., Esq. (May 10, 1946).
7 See Nannery, supra note76, at 547-48; see also Stempel et al., supra note 70.
80 See Thomas O. Main et al., The Elastics of Snap Removal: An Empirical Case
Study of Textualism 69 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 289, 296 (2021). See generally John F. Manning,
The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387 (2003) (arguing against "absurd result"
exception to literal approach to statutory language).
81 See generally United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985).
82 Id. at 86; 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1787.
83 Locke, 471 U.S. at 88-89; 43 U.S.C. § 1744.
84 See Locke, 471 U.S. at 94-99. But see id. at 118-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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require someone to file something under severe penalty for
default the day before the last day of the year."8 _
In cases like Locke, the words in question are clear. We
all know what "December 31" means and what "before" means.
In Locke itself, there was no factual ambiguity (e.g., an attempt
to file at 11:59 only to be foiled by a defective time stamp, a
power failure, or the like). Rather, the question was whether to
give literal enforcement of this odd deadline or whether to read
it as a scrivener's error that should not result in a permit
holder's disproportionate forfeiture of mining rights.86 The Court
majority opted for literalism, with two dissenters arguing for a
construction that saved the individual's property interest from
total loss due to a one-day delay in filing.87 Regardless of which
view is right (as a contextualist who thinks law should "abhor a
forfeiture," my sympathies are with the dissent), the decision is
not one for which corpus linguistics has much to contribute. The
words are clear. The hard question-indeed, the only question-
is what to do with the words.
B. Illuminating Language in a Helpful But Not Fully
Determinative Manner
1. Muscarello v. United States
Muscarello v. United States88 has long been a topic of
scholarly attention and has received renewed attention from
corpus linguists.89 The case involved a drug sale in which the
defendant had a gun in the locked glove compartment of his
truck. After his apprehension, the government sought to have
his sentence enhanced pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), which
provides that if a person "during and in relation to any crime of
violence or drug trafficking crime . . . uses or carries a firearm"
5 See ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 7, at 446-47. Making the seemingly
harsh literalism of the case even harsher, is the history of the land and an arguable
estoppel argument that the Court rejected, which may be unjust but not surprising in
that estoppel generally is inapplicable against governments, at least for conduct or
statements by lower level agents. See id. at 447 ("[T]he Locke family had been exercising
rights to mine gravel on federal land since the 1950s. Knowing they were required to file
papers in order to retain these rights, they sent their daughter to the nearest BLM office,
which told there that claims had to be filed by December 31. The Lockes filed on that
date, and the BLM [Bureau of Land Management] rejected the papers on the ground
that they were too late[,]" a decision affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court.).
86 See Locke, 471 U.S. at 93.
87 See id. at 96; id. at 117 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 117-19 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
88 See Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998).
89 See, e.g., Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 4, at 845-48; Mouritsen, supra note
4, at 1926; see also Bernstein, Half-Empirical Attitude, supra note 3, at 13 (referring to
Muscarello as "much-trodden case").
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there shall "in addition to the punishment provided for such
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, be [an additional
sentence of imprisonment] of not less than 5 years."90 In effect,
the drug dealer defendant found to have used or carried a
firearm has an additional five years tacked on to whatever other
sentence would be imposed for the drug crime.
Muscarello contended that the presence of a gun in his
vehicle (particularly in a locked glove compartment) was not
what is meant by the "use or carry" language in the statute. The
Supreme Court rather quickly agreed that the gun (which
remained in the glove compartment throughout the drug deal)
had not been used. The Court divided sharply, however as to
whether Muscarello had "carried" the gun during his
commitment of the crime.91
Justice Breyer, writing for a 5-4 majority, held that the
gun had indeed been carried.92 Justice Ginsburg and fellow
dissenters both disagreed regarding the most apt construction of
the term "carry"93 but, more importantly from a contextualist
perspective, chided the majority for failing to apply the "rule of
lenity" that is the supposed norm in criminal law statutory
construction disputes.94
Section 924(c)(1), as the foregoing discussion details, is not decisively
clear one way or another. The sharp division in the Court on the
proper reading of the measure confirms, "at the very least, . . . that
the issue is subject to some doubt. Under these circumstances, we
80 See Muscarello, 524 U.S at 126-27; 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)-(c)(1)(A)(i).
91 See Muscarello, 524 U.S at 127-32. Prior to Muscarello:
In Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993), the Court held that, when a
person traded a gun for drugs, he "used" the gun in violation of § 924(c)(1).
Justices Scalia's dissenting opinion contended that the ordinary meaning of §
924(c)(1), read in context, is that "uses a firearm" means "used the firearm as
a weapon," and that in any event the issues was sufficiently doubtful for the
rule of lenity to control the outcome in favor of the defendant. In Bailey v.
United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), a unanimous Court held that the "use"
element requires active employment of the firearm by the defendant, such that
it did not apply to a defendant who had a gun in the trunk of his car in which
illegal drugs were found or to a defendant who had a gun locked in a trunk in
a closet in a bedroom where illegal drugs were stored.
See ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 7, at 655.
92 See Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 139. The majority elaborates on its linguistic
points. Id. at 127-32.
93 See id. at 142-43 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Unlike the Court, I do not think
dictionaries, surveys of press reports, or the Bible tell us, dispositively, what 'carries' means
embedded in § 924(c)(1)."). The dissent elaborates on its linguistic points. Id. at 142-44.
94 See id. at 148-50.
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adhere to the familiar rule that, 'where there is ambiguity in a
criminal statute, doubts are resolved in favor of the defendant."' 96
In contending that Muscarello had indeed carried a gun
in the commission of a crime, Justice Breyer and the majority
engaged in a randomly de facto corpus linguistics analysis that
included a broad survey of usage of the word "carry" and its
variants such as "carries" or "carried," that has no apparent or
explained basis for the opinion's selection or ranking of sources.
As a result, the majority opinion has attracted criticism not only
from civil libertarians, but also from corpus linguists for its lack
of professional rigor and for error in discerning the apt
construction of the term "carry."96
The dissent's critique avoids the majority's flailing search
to find a broad connotation of "carry" that sustains conviction
when substantive criminal law demands the opposite. The
dissent also steps back from merely counting examples to
address a larger concern posed by interpretive efforts.
Unlike the Court, I do not think dictionaries, surveys of press reports,
or the Bible tell us, dispositively, what "carries" means embedded in
§ 924(c)(1). On definitions, "carry" in legal formulations could mean,
inter alia, transport, possess, have in stock, prolong (carry over), be
infectious, or wear or bear on one's person. At issue here is not
"carries" at large but "carries a firearm." The Court's computer search
of newspapers is revealing in this light. Carrying guns in a car showed
up as the meaning "perhaps more than one third" of the time. One is
left to wonder what meaning showed up some two-thirds of the time.
Surely a most familiar meaning is, as the Constitution's Second
Amendment ("keep and bear Arms") and Black's Law Dictionary, at
214, indicate: "wear, bear, or carry ... upon the person or in the
clothing or in a pocket, for the purpose .. . of being armed and ready
for offensive or defensive action in a case of conflict with another
person."
On lessons from literature, a scan of Bartlett's and other quotation
collections [in the majority opinion] shows how highly selective the
Court's choices are. If "[t]he greatest of writers" have used "carry" to
mean convey or transport in a vehicle, so have they used the hydra-
95 See id. at 148 (alteration in original) (quoting Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United
States, 434 U.S. 275, 284-85 (1978)).
96 See Lee & Mourtisen, supra note 4, at 846-48 (summarizing that "[t]o the
extent that we view the question of ordinary meaning as involving statistical frequency,
the analysis above tells us that carry on one's person is overwhelmingly the most common
use, while carry in a care is a possible but far less common use"); Mourtisen, supra note 4,
at 1946-48, 1951-66; see also id. at 1948 ("Justice Breyer is searching for only for sentences
containing [the words] carry, firearm, and vehicle. In these circumstances, we might expect
to see only sentences referring to the carry. That only one-third of the sentences returned
contained this usage is actually surprising ... Justice Breyer has merely confirmed that
carry is sometimes used ... but he has certainly not confirmed that carry is the ordinary
meaning. In fact, because the search terms were skewed in favor of carry, the paucity of
instances of carry, suggests that carry, is somewhat unusual.").
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headed word to mean, inter alia, carry in one's hand, arms, head,
heart, or soul, sans vehicle. Consider, among countless examples:
"[H]e shall gather the lambs with his arm, and carry them in
his bosom." The King James Bible, Isaiah 40:11.
"And still they gaz'd, and still the wonder grew, That one
small head could carry all he knew."
0. Goldsmith, The Deserted Village, ll. 215-216, in The
Poetical Works of Oliver Goldsmith 30 (A. Dobson ed. 1949).
"There's a Legion that never was listed, That carries no
colours or crest."
R. Kipling, The Lost Legion, st. 1, in Rudyard Kipling's Verse, 1885-
1918, p. 222 (1920).
"There is a homely adage which runs, 'Speak softly and carry a big
stick; you will go far."' T. Roosevelt, Speech at Minnesota State Fair,
Sept. 2, 1901, in J. Bartlett, Familiar Quotations 575:16 (J. Kaplan
ed. 1992).
These and the Court's lexicological sources demonstrate vividly that
"carry" is a word commonly used to convey various messages. Such
references, given their variety, are not reliable indicators of what
Congress meant, in § 924(c)(1), by "carries a firearm."97
My point here is not to retread ground previously and
better broken by others regarding Muscarello, but rather to note
that even in this type of case (correctly) seized on by corpus
linguistics advocates as an example of a decision that could be
improved through a more structured and scientific analysis than
that used by the Court, corpus linguistics may be of limited utility.
The corpus linguistics critique of Muscarello has an affinity with
the critique often made of legislative history: That the Court
(particularly the majority) looked into a crowded field of verbiage
97 See Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 142-44 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (alterations
and emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted). In scholarly quarters, Justice
Breyer's invocation of the King James Bible has achieved a level of criticism-cum-ridicule
resembling that of Justice Harry Blackman's embarrassing "[O]de to [B]aseball,"
WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 35, at 229, in the infamous Flood v. Kuhn, 407
U.S. 258, 285 (1972) (exempting Major League Baseball from antitrust law and
permitting continued servitude of players on strength of ill-reasoned Fed. Baseball Club
v. Nat'l League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922) and Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S.
356 (1953)). See, e.g., WoODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 35, at 224-31 (noting
widespread bemusement at Justice Blackmun's star-struck approach to the sport (but
apparently not to the players who wanted to be free from an oppressive league regime of
player control) that included ribbing from another Justice who baited Blackmun about
omission in his list of baseball greats); see also Mouritsen, supra note 4, at 1930-35
(criticizing Justice Breyer's majority opinion for error in positing that order of dictionary
definitions of "carry" was based on prevailing "primary" usage when most dictionaries
present definitions historically from oldest to newest use).
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and spotted its "friends,"-in the form of uses of the word carry
that fit with the personal preferences of the Justices.98
The majority in particular appears to have come to a view
and then strung together a potpourri of usages that reflect similar
perspectives, in particular the view that any sort of transit of a
gun amounts to "carrying" the weapon for purpose of criminal
culpability meriting an additional five years in jail.99 To some
extent this is the norm in judging and advocacy, even if this may
be a painful admission for the legal profession. The brain excels
at "confirmation bias" and assembles information to accord with
its prevailing orientation, a trait most likely exacerbated by the
advocacy of counsel who can be depended upon to collect examples
of word usage that favor a client's position.
In perhaps similar fashion, I have a preferred reading of
the term "carry a firearm" that is perhaps unduly the result of
reading too many detective stories and watching too many police
procedurals on television. Like the Muscarello dissenters00 (and
implicitly the dissenting Justice Scalia in Smith v. United
Statesio1 who argued that "use" of a firearm means use of the
firearm as a weapon), it seems clear to me that when an ordinary
native English-speaking American in the late twentieth century
(the sentence enhancement was enacted in 1968) speaks of
carrying a gun, she is talking about carrying the gun on one's
person, not in the vehicle used to take her somewhere, even the
location of planned crime.
While I am happy that corpus linguistics analysis
supports this view and that of the Muscarello dissenters, the
case illustrates the limits not only of haphazard data collection
about words, but also reveals the limits of even rigorous,
thorough, and fair analysis by linguistic professionals. While
assessing lay usage of a term through the lens of a large
database adds potentially valuable knowledge, it is not a magic
bullet. The court must also examine whether a specialized
meaning was intended, the role of the disputed statutory term
in the larger statutory scheme, relation to other substantive
legal policies (e.g., the rule of lenity),12 and the consequences
98 See Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History
in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IowA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983) (attributing the
analogy to D.C. Circuit Judge Harold Leventhal).
99 See Lawrence M. Solan, The New Textualist's New Text, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
2027, 2053 (2005) (viewing clash of majority and dissenting opinions as a judicial "food
fight" more "than a serious argument among distinguished jurists").
100 See Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 139 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
101 See Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 244 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
102 See Mouritsen, supra note 4, at 1917-18 ("In the midst of all of the Muscarello
Court's lexical wrangling, it is easy to lose sight of what is at stake. Frank Muscarello set out
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and ramifications of its decision. Even in this classic case of
debate over the "ordinary" or plain meaning of a word, data
analysis confined solely to word usage patterns cannot
definitively resolve the dispute.
2. Lachs v. Fidelity & Casualty Insurance
Both the limits and potential of corpus linguistics
analysis to enhance understanding of word usage, in contracts
as well as statutes-particularly words that have fallen out of
use-is illustrated in Lachs v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.103 Sadie
Bernstein, consulting a travel agent, booked a flight from
Newark to Miami for the following day. When arriving at the
airport, "[s]he purchased 'Airline Trip Insurance' in the sum of
$25,000 from an automatic vending machine. She then went to
the Consolidated Air Service counter and completed her flight
arrangements" and "entered the plane ... and in less than an
hour was dead as the result of a crash."104
When the Bernstein estate sued to collect the insurance
proceeds, the insurer asserted that flights by "non-scheduled"
airlines, such as Miami Airline, Inc., were not within the grant of
coverage.105 Although both the court majority, which found
coverage and ordered payment,106 and the dissent, which regarded
the claim as barred by the non-scheduled airline limitation,107
bandied the term around at length, both did so without the
discipline now available via corpus linguistics analysis.
The majority was . less concerned about precise
determination of the meaning of terms like "Civilian Scheduled
Airline" and "non-scheduled" airline in the policy, terms the insurer
read as foreclosing coverage because Miami Airline, Inc. was what
people now typically describe as a charter service rather than a
mainstream carrier such as American Airlines or United Airlines.
to sell marijuana" but had his "likely ten-to-sixteen month [enhanced] sentence ... [extended]
to a mandatory five years, plus the additional six-to-twelve months for his underlying drug
offense" even though he never removed his gun from the glove compartment of his car.)
103 See generally Lachs v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 118 N.E.2d 555 (N.Y. 1954). I
regard the case as overlooked not only because it is not well-known, but also because it
is typically characterized as a case about flight insurance or vending machine/kiosk
insurance when it in fact has much broader implications and illustrates operation of
insurance policy construction based on the objectively reasonable expectations of the
policyholder, and did so well before Professor Robert E. Keeton coined the term in a
famous article, Insurance Law Rights at Variance With Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L.
REV. 961 (1970). See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Lachs v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York:
Timeless and Ahead of Its Time, 2 NEV. L.J. 319, 320 (2002).
104 Lachs, 118 N.E.2d at 556-57.
105 Id. at 559.
106 Id. at 560.
107 Id. at 563 (Fuld, J., dissenting).
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The majority noted that according to plaintiff (the executor of the
Bernstein estate), the setting in which the insurance policy was sold
emphasized the words "Airline Trip Insurance," (including
illustrations of a plane in flight) without qualification along with
advertised policy limits of a maximum of $25,000.108
In what the court described as "much smaller print" that
was allegedly obscured by the vending machine's presentation of
the sample policy, the policy sold stated that it
[clovers first one-way flight shown on application (also return flight if
round trip airline ticket purchased) completed in 12 months within or
between United States, Alaska, Hawaii or Canada or between any
point therein and any point in Mexico, Bermuda or West Indies on any
scheduled airline. Policy void outside above limits. For 'international'
coverage see airline agent . . .. This insurance shall apply only to such
injuries sustained following the purchase by or for the Insured of a
transportation ticket from .. . a Scheduled Airline during any portion
of the first one way or round airline trip covered by such
transportation ticket . .. in consequence of: (a) boarding, riding as a
passenger in, alighting from or coming in contact with any aircraft
operated on a regular or special or chartered flight by a Civilian
Scheduled Airline maintaining regular, published schedules and
licensed for interstate, intrastate or international transportation of
passengers by the Governmental Authority having jurisdiction over
Civil Aviation .. .. Defendant on its part points to the fact that there
was hanging on the wall at the right hand end of the counter where
decedent picked up her ticket, a fairly large sign-approximately
three feet by four feetF-bearing the caption in large size capital
letters: "Non Scheduled Air Carriers Authorized To Conduct Business
In This Terminal" .... There is, of course, no proof that decedent ever
saw the sign.1 09
As one might surmise from this descriptive setting of the
factual table, the court majority was more concerned about
whether the marketing arrangement adequately informed the
decedent of any limitations on coverage. The insurer argued that
a "Civilian Scheduled Airline" was an "air carrier which obtains
a certificate of public convenience and necessity as provided in
Section 401 of the Civil Aeronautics Act"11 and that this term
has
a clear and definite meaning has caused it to bring forward and
present an enormous amount of proof extrinsic to the policy including
a statute, regulations, newspaper and magazine articles, etc. By this
mountain of work it seems to us that defendant has established that
"Civilian Scheduled Airline" is not at all free from ambiguity and
vagueness if it were not so the contract of insurance itself would
108 Id. at 557 (majority opinion).
109 Id.at 557-58 (second and third alteration in original) (emphasis added).
110 Id. at 560.
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disclose within its four corners the intent of the parties in entering
into it.i1
In other words, this insurer, nearly seventy years ago,
was engaging in an informal version of corpus linguistics
analysis, marshalling as many examples as it could of the usage
of the terms "civilian scheduled airline" and its informal cousin
a "scheduled airline." While this fell on comparatively deaf ears
with respect to the majority, which took a more contextual,
reasonable expectations approach that imposed coverage absent
clear language to the contrary, particularly in view of the setting
of the sale that raised reasonable expectations of coverage by the
decedent policyholder (all good decisions in my view),112 the
dissent was very favorably influenced by the insurer's examples
of use of the term in writings aimed at laypersons.113
The dissent focused relentlessly on the meaning of policy
text mentioning "scheduled" and "non-scheduled" airlines, albeit
with a rather different view of the setting of the sale than that
held by the majority. The dissent's discussion (reproduced at
length to give the reader a sense of the dissent's approach)
stated:
While it might have been sufficient to show that there are two
separate and distinct classes of airlines, the "scheduled" and the
"nonscheduled," the insurer went far beyond that in this case.
Recognizing, perhaps, the inconspicuousness of the obvious,
defendant has marshalled a veritable mountain of material contained
in statute and regulations, in opinions and reports, in newspapers and
magazines to demonstrate that the term "scheduled airline" has
gained a wide and general currency, and that it is a term of clear and
precise meaning, which has become part and parcel of the ordinary
person's everyday vocabulary. Defined by any standard and from any
point of view, and compressed into a sentence, it simply and solely
denotes a common carrier permitted to operate, or to hold out to the
public that it operates, one or more airplanes between designated
points regularly, or with a reasonable degree of regularity, in
accordance with a previously announced schedule.
Its origin is in the Civil Aeronautics Act and the pertinent regulations
issued by the Civil Aeronautics Board .... The courts, as well as
Congress and the Civil Aeronautics Board, have invariably recognized
that the "scheduled airline" is a definite, well-understood class of
carrier .... As a response to all this, plaintiff contends that, whatever
meaning the term may have under the statute or under the
regulations, that meaning, in the absence of an express .incorporation
of such material, does not bind one not chargeable with knowledge of
administrative action. The point might be well taken, if to the so-called
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id. at. 562-63 (Fuld, J., dissenting).
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"average" man upon whose knowledge plaintiff relies the term had a
meaning which was unclear or different from that announced by the
regulatory agency or the courts. Words may, of course, have different
significations to different people, at different times or under different
circumstances, but that is not the case insofar as the term "scheduled
airline" is concerned. The meaning given it by law has, as it were,
passed into the public domain, where, in line with the current zest for
abbreviation, it is usually referred to as a "sked,"to differentiate it from
its counterpart, the "nonsked."
In point of fact, we might well have taken judicial notice of the term
and its meaning, had the record not been as replete as it is with
illustrations from the daily press and from popular magazines and
books with large nationwide circulations. For instance, the president
of a firm leasing planes to a non-scheduled carrier wrote in Fortune
Magazine for August, 1949: "It is now only a year ago that my air-
freight line, California Eastern Airways, Inc., leased one of its DC-4
ships to a 'large irregular' or non-scheduled carrier, popularly known
as a nonsked ... Non-scheduled airlines use the same well-proved
planes used by all airlines. But Douglas DC-3's of the scheduled
airlines carry twenty-one seats; those of the nonskeds, twenty-eight.
Most of the DC-4's of the scheduled lines contain forty-four seats; we
now have sixty-seven in ours". A feature article in the March, 1951,
issue of Cosmopolitan Magazine captioned, "Don't Fly the
Unscheduled Air Lines!", takes for granted the classification of, and
the distinction between, scheduled and nonscheduled carriers. And in
Harper's Magazine for May, 1949, we find this discussion of scheduled
airlines and nonscheduled flights: "Including taxes, you would pay
$113 for a non-scheduled flight from New York to Los Angeles, as
against $181 on a scheduled airline. These carriers are non-scheduled
in the sense that they are not permitted by the Civil Aeronautics
Board to fly more than a limited number of trips between any two
cities each month, and because they cannot, therefore, represent
themselves to the public as running on regular time-tables."
It is thus made evident that the general public encountered the term
"scheduled airline" in the course of its normal and ordinary reading of
newspapers and magazines, and the context in which the term
appeared demonstrates that to the average person it had the same
clear and definite meaning as it had for the federal agency which
originally used it.114
The dissent's assembly of both technical and press usage
of the terms "scheduled" and "non-scheduled" flights, aided by
the briefing of insurer counsel,115 is impressive. Sixty-five years
114 Id. at 561-63 (third alteration in original) (emphasis added) (internal
citations omitted).
116 Id. at 560 (majority opinion). This was an impressive amount of work (and
billing to the client) to devote to contesting a $25,000 flight/life insurance policy. Although
this amount equates to nearly $240,000 in 2020 (lawyer billings would presumably reflect
a similar increase), one wonders about the insurer's cost-benefit analysis in that it surely
expended as much or more in defense costs in a case that appears (perhaps with the benefit
of hindsight) to be anything but a sure winner and in a state that does not impose counsel
fees on a losing party. See RANDY MANILOFF & JEFFREY STEMPEL, GENERAL LIABILITY
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later, a court faced with the same questions could review a
corpus linguistics examination submitted by counsel that may
or may not support the dissent's view that, at least in the early
1950s "everyone" knew what these terms meant. This would be
a considerable refinement of the type of debate that went on in
Lachs, in which the majority found different usages sufficient to
trigger the rule that ambiguities are resolved against the drafter
(almost always the insurer and indisputably the insurer in this
case) while the dissent saw a clear pattern, at least in the
magazines it cited.116
But empirical data-even if done more systematically
than by the Lachs Court and based on millions of documents-
remains just data. An advocate or adjudicator still must decide
what to do with the information. To illustrate this dilemma using
the traditional judicial framework for interpreting contracts, if
the understanding of the terms as set forth in the dissent was
reflected in a corpus linguistics examination, the insurer would
presumably argue that it was the beneficiary of a clearly written,
widely understood limitation on coverage that precluded any
judicial consideration of contextual factors or the policyholder's
own understanding or reliance. Conversely, if the big data was
inconclusive, the estate of the policyholder would argue that the
policy was ambiguous on its face, opening the door to receipt of
the extrinsic evidence favoring the decedent policyholder or
triggering contra proferentem in her favor (or both).
Even if corpus linguistics big data supported the dissent,
the policyholder's estate still would have the arguments the
majority found persuasive: (1) The circumstances surrounding
the sale of the flight insurance that could be read as creating an
expectation of coverage in ordinary passengers; (2) that data-
driven analysis may not be sufficiently strong to preclude
deeming a term ambiguous; (3) the norm of insurance law that
policy provisions narrowing or defeating coverage are treated as
exclusions, even if not so denominated, and that exclusions are
strictly construed against insurers with the burden to show
applicability of the exclusion placed upon the insurer; (4) public
policies favor victim compensation in order to avoid
disproportionate forfeiture, and; (5) placing liability on the
cheapest cost avoider.117
INSURANCE COVERAGE: KEY ISSUES IN EVERY STATE 317-18 (4th ed. 2018) (fee shifting
available to policyholders in some cases but not to insurers except pursuant o civil rules of
general applicability such as a rule against frivolous litigation).
116 See supra notes 108-114 and accompanying text.
117 See generally Lachs, 118 N.E.2d at 556-60.
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In addition, flight insurance is a particularly profitable line
of insurance for reasons that auger in favor of deciding close
questions (and perhaps even not-so-close questions) in favor of
coverage. Although premiums are comparatively low, it does not
provide much coverage in that it insures the life of the policyholder
only for the few hours of the flight.118 By contrast, an ordinary life
insurer is providing round-the-clock, 24/7 coverage for a premium
that is much lower per minute of coverage.
Furthermore, the flight insurance business model
involves very low overhead and minimal underwriting.119 Fine.
Bully for the flight insurer for restraining operating costs. But
having chosen this business model that provides potentially
misleading marketing and no agent that can correct consumer
misunderstanding, it hardly seems unfair to hold the flight
insurer to the consequences. Put another way, it seems unfair to
permit an insurer to deny a claim based on the insurer's
understanding of a specialized term that could not be read and
reflected upon by a purchaser in an environment the insurer
knew was not conducive to careful study of policy language.
Conversely, the dissent could counter that its linguistic
analysis involved not only a data-driven account of layperson use
of the terms "scheduled" and "non-scheduled" but also an
assessment of the technical background and meaning of the
terms. The majority would reply that technical or specialized
understandings should not control against a claim by a
consumer layperson with no prior course of dealing with the
insurer. And then there is the matter of the arguably defective
delivery of the policy, which took place because the insurer relied
on vending machine sales rather than providing a sales counter
where a prospective policyholder could obtain a legible copy of
the policy and ask questions of the company representative.12o
119 See id. at 557 ("AIRLINE TRIP INSURANCE.. .. '[c]overs first one-way flight
shown on application (also return flight if round tip airline ticket is purchased .. )").
it In addition to providing only brief (the length of the plane flight) and limited
(covering death only from a crash; death by illness unrelated to the flight or other injuries are
not covered), airline flight insurance involves low overhead in that the insurer invests no
resources in underwriting and few in claims (because there are so few claims). Consequently,
the cost of the insurance per amount and time of coverage is very low and the product is very
profitable. Or at least it was. Sales of the product have diminished as passengers came to view
flying as safer. See LIMRA Behavior Economics and Life Insurance: People Respond to Emotions
- Not Just Facts, ADVISOR MAG. (Feb. 8, 2013), https:/www.lifehealth.com/limra-behavioral-
economics-and-life-insurance/ [https:/perma.c/WL5D-RW6Y]; see also Flyer Beware: Is Travel
Insurance Worth It?, OFF. SENATOR EDWARD J. MARKEY (D. MAsS.) (Aug. 21, 2018),
httpsJ/www.markey.senate.gov/news/press-releases/flyer-beware-is-travel-insurance-worth-it
[https:/perma.cc/SDS7-PSJF] (concluding that the answer is no, and that broader based travel
insurance that provides more comprehensive coverage than flight insurance, and covers injury
and illness during an entire trip, is similarly profitable for insurers).
120 See generally Lachs, 118 N.E.2d. at 556.
4272021]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
Thus, even in a type of case that would seem tailor-made
for corpus linguistics, thorough examination does not resolve the
dispute unless the court adopts a strictly textualist attitude and is
so sure of the corpus linguistics results that it refuses to consider
not only contextual factors bearing on meaning, but also the
relevant body of substantive law applicable to the case. The "rules
of the road" for resolving insurance coverage disputes would be
applicable regardless of whether corpus linguistics analysis takes
place and may limit the application or decisiveness of even well-
done textual data analysis coming to a strong conclusion as to word
meaning. The same holds for other areas of substantive law in
which particular doctrine and practice may provide ground rules of
interpretation that depart from a purely textual analysis. An
example would be the preference for. enforcing arbitration clauses,
particularly in labor agreements.121
C. Shedding More Determinative Light on Language But
Continuing to Benefit from Context: Holy Trinity Church
as Example
Holy Trinity Church v. United States,122 one of the most
studied cases of statutory construction,123 provides an example
of a case where analysis driven by textual data can be extremely,
perhaps even determinatively illuminating. Because the case
has been so thoroughly examined at length by scholars with
considerable expertise, I will address it only briefly.
The case involved a law prohibiting payment of transit
expenses to import persons who would "perform labor or service
of any kind."124 The Holy Trinity Church faced sanctions because
121 See Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002) (consumer
brokerage agreement); Groves v. Ring Screw Works, Ferndale Fastener Div'n, 498 U.S.
168, 173 (1990) (labor agreement); ESRIDGE, ET AL., supra note 7, at 1168 (Appendix B,
collecting specific substantive law canons of construction).
122 Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
123 See generally, e.g., Carol Chomsky, Unlocking the Mysteries of Holy Trinity:
Sprit, Letter, and History in Statutory Interpretation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 901 (2000);
Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold
Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833 (1998).
124 Holy Trinity Church, 143 U.S. at 458; see also Alien Contract Labor Law of
1885, ch. 164, § 1, 23 Stat. 332 ("[I]t shall be unlawful for any person, company, partnership,
or corporation, in any manner whatsoever, to prepay the transportation, or in any way
assist or encourage the importation or migration of any alien or aliens, any foreigner or
foreigners, into the United states, its Territories, or the District of Columbia, under
contract or agreement, parol or special, express or implied, made previous to the
importation or migration of such alien or aliens, foreigner or foreigners, to perform labor or
service of any kind in the United States, its Territories, or the District of Columbia.
[However,] nothing in this act shall ... be so construed as to prevent any person or persons,
partnership, or corporation from engaging, under contract or agreement, skilled workman
in foreign countries to perform labor in the United States in or upon any new industry not
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it paid for the passage from England of a minister.15 The Church
argued that it was exempt from the law because ministers were
not laborers performing labor within the meaning of the statute.
The Supreme Court agreed in an opinion that, although widely
regarded as correct on the law, has attracted criticism from
textualists because it relied on the "spirit" of the law and
legislative intent26 and from secularists and non-Christians
because Justice Brewer engaged in a bit of discriminatory-cum-
jingoist rhetoric about America being a "Christian Nation" that
privileged religion (and Christianity in particular), over other
activities27 and expressed classist notions about the superiority
of intellectual work over physical exertion128
A definitive "last word" on the Court's assessment of
statutory text has probably been delivered by Professors Gales
and Solan, who conducted extensive corpus linguistics analysis
of the statutory words "labor" and "laborer" by looking to
ordinary use of the terms during the relevant time period in a
variety of databases, both general and specialized.129 Although
at present established in the United States: Provided, That skilled labor for that purpose
cannot be otherwise obtained; nor shall the provisions of this act apply to professional
actors, artists, lecturers, or singers, nor to persons employed strictly as personal or
domestic servants: Provided, That nothing in this act shall be construed as prohibiting any
individual from assisting any member of his family or any relative or personal friend, to
migrate from any foreign country to the United States, for the purpose of settlement here.").
125 Holy Trinity Church, 143 U.S. at 472. In 1888, the Church was "prosecuted and
fined .. . for violating the law." Tammy Gales & Lawrence M. Solan, Revisiting a Classic Problem
in Statutory Interpretation: Is a Minister a Laborer?, 36 GA. STATE U. L. REV. 491, 494 (2020).
126 See Holy Trinity Church, 143 U.S. at 459 ("It is a familiar rule, that a thing
may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within
its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers. This has been often asserted, and the
reports are full of cases illustrating its application. This is not the substitution of the will
of the judge for that of the legislator, for frequently words of general meaning are used
in a statute, words broad enough to include an act in question, and yet a consideration
of the whole legislation, or of the circumstances surrounding its enactment, or of the
absurd results which follow from giving such broad meaning to the words, makes it
unreasonable to believe that the legislator intended to include the particular act.").
127 See Mokhtar Ben Barka, The Christian Nation Debate and the U.S. Supreme
Court, 6 EUR. J. OF AM. STUD. 1, 2, 6-7 (2011) (noting controversy and religious division in
U.S.); Steven K. Green, Justice David Josiah Brewer and the "Christian Nation" Maxim, 63
ALBANY L. REV. 427, 427-28 (1999) (noting controversy regarding this rhetoric in case); Alan
M. Dershowitz, Justice O'Connor's Second Indiscretion, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 1989),
https://www.nytimes.com/1989/04/02/opinion/justice-o-connor-s-second-indiscretion.html
[httpsJ/perma.cc/HJ7C-FQ8S] (prominent Jewish law professor criticizes Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor's seeming endorsement of Christian nation portion of Holy Trinity); see also Lynch
v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 688, 717-18 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing Christian
Nation rhetoric in Holy Trinity).
128 See Green, supra note 27at 465-66, 471.
129 See Gales & Solan, supra note 125, at 502-03. As the authors summarized:
Analysis of date from USSL [United States Statutes at Large], COHA [Corpus
of Historical American English], COCA [Corpus of Contemporary American
English], and Google Books suggests the following facts:
4292021]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
professing to "take no stand on the Supreme Court's actual
holding,"130 they find that it "appears to us that the Court got the
ordinary meaning argument correct based on corpus analysis"
and that "the history of usage [of the terms] in both statutory
and ordinary language do support the Court's decision."ii
The Gales-Solan analysis is something of a textual tour
de force. It takes a case where corpus linguistics analysis is
likely to be helpful: one where construction of a term is crucial
to the decision but that resists "seat-of-the-pants" or "gut"
understanding of the term by modern readers because of the age
of the case and where legislative intent was not clearly set forth
by Congress and where contemporary readers are not personally
familiar with the background of the legislation.132 It then
- "Labor or Service" in either order was used through most of the
nineteenth century to refer to manual, slave-like labor.
* In legal contexts, the expression was used to specifically
characterize slaves themselves. Article IV of the Constitution
contains a fugitive slave provision that uses exactly that language
and the Fugitive Slave Acts of 1793 and 1850 do so as well, as do
other statutes from that era.
It is therefore not clear whether to consider "labor or service" as a single
construction [in which the words should be read as one term expressing a
particular concept] meaning the type of work that slaves perform or as an
ordinary compound disjunctive noun phrase [in which each word in the phrase
should be applied independently]. That is, one can ask either about the
expression "labor or service" or about "labor" and "service" separately. The
Court seemed to choose the latter course, although we argue here that the
former course may have been more faithful to the meaning of the term as
understood at the time based on the following:
. When the activities of clergy were represented in the corpora,
"labor" was rarely used other than in "labor of the Lord" and similar
expressions. Yet, while rare, the corpus demonstrated occasional use
of "labor" in connection with the tasks that members of the clergy
performed.
- When the corpora demonstrated that clergy perform a "service," it
was either in the sense of being "in the service of the lord" or
providing a positive "service" to the community. However, the
decision placed more focus on the former term-"labor"-than on the
latter-"service."
Id. at 532-33.
130 Id. at 533. With all due respect to Professors Gales and Solan, they may
disclaim taking a position but one cannot read their article without coming away with
the definite and firm conviction that the statute was not intended to apply to clergy and
that the "labor"-related language in the statute did not include clergy. The data analysis
of the article makes it impossible (in my view) for one to persuasively argue giving the
word "labor" a broad reading that encompasses clergy. See id. at 520-31.
131 Id. at 533.
132 Although perhaps cause for concern about courts engaging in extra-record
analysis, it seems indisputable that judges reviewing modern legislation (e.g., the Age
Discrimination Act) or regulations (e.g., those implementing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and
other legislation seeking to shore up the financial system after the Great Recession of
2008) would bring to the analysis their own sense of the background and purpose of the
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conducts a broad and rigorous analysis of word usage of the era
that considers the identity of both drafter and reader of the
statute. And it finds the data to weigh in favor of the Court's
construction of the disputed term.
But even in this instance involving a highly text-based
analysis of a statute written long ago, the enterprise of determining
meaning is well-aided by consideration of contextual information.
The Holy Trinity Church Court, whatever its other failings, did
this, looking first at the legislative history of the law33 and the
purpose and objective of the law134 as well as precedent. The Court
found that examination of the particular legislative history and
general background, purpose and objectives of the statue strongly
suggests that when Congress referred to "labor" it meant what we
now call manual labor and not what we now deem white-collar
work.135
It appears uncontested that the law was passed to reduce
the importation of "cheap" foreign labor undercutting the wages
and employability of native workers. There was undoubtedly
anti-immigrant prejudice in the mix as well but that also augers
in favor of reading the law (so long as not violative of any civil
rights mandates) to permit a white, Anglo-Saxon English
minister to be paid traveling expenses to come to preach to a
statute or rule. Similarly, judges, especially those that conducted commercial litigation
prior to taking the bench, would seem inevitably to view contract language in light of
their own commercial experiences. Older documentary writings logically make this
factor less important to a judge's assessment of word meaning.
133 Holy Trinity Church, 143 U.S. at 461-65.
134 Id. at 463 ("[A]nother guide to the meaning of a statute is found in the evil
which it is designed to remedy; and for this the court properly looks at contemporaneous
events, the situation as it existed, and as it was pressed upon the attention of the
legislative body.") The Court further noted that
[t]he motives and history of the act are matters of common knowledge. It had
become the practice for large capitalists in this country to contract with their
agents abroad for the shipment of great numbers of an ignorant and servile
class of foreign laborers, under contracts by which the employer agreed, upon
the one hand, to prepay their passage, while, on the other hand, the laborers
agreed to work after their arrival for a certain time at a low rate of wages. The
effect of this was to break down the labor market, and to reduce other laborers
engaged in like occupations to the level of the assisted immigrant. The evil
finally became so flagrant that an appeal was made to [C]ongress for relief by
the passage of the act in question, the design of which was to raise the standard
for foreign immigrants, and to discountenance the migration of those who had
not sufficient means in their own hands, or those of their friends, to pay their
passage.
It appears, also, from the petitions, and in the testimony presented before the
committees of [C]ongress, that it was this cheap unskilled labor which was
making the trouble, and the influx of which Congress sought to prevent.
Id. at 463-64 (quoting United States v. Craig, 28 F.795, 798 (E.D. Mich.1886)).
135 See id. at 459-60.
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congregation of white, Anglo-Saxon privileged Manhattanites.
And, notwithstanding the perhaps cringeworthy "Christian
Nation" rhetoricss of Justice Brewer, he is correct that the
United States has almost always given religion favorable
treatment under the law.17
Although the Court's elitist, class-based rhetoric,138 like its
"Christian Nation" religiosity, was unfortunate, its contextual
assessment appears correct, as was its linguistic assessment.
Perhaps more important, the textual and contextual are aligned,
which strongly suggests the result is correct. Examination of
seeming congressional intent and the background and general
purpose of the law buttresses a reading of statutory text that now
has been demonstrated to accord with usage of the time.
136 See id. at 465-71 ("But beyond all these matters no purpose of action against
religion can be imputed to any legislation, state or national, because this is a religious
people. This is historically true. From the discovery of this continent to the present hour,
there is a single voice making this affirmation . . . . There is no dissonance in these
declarations. There is a universal language pervading them all, having one meaning;
they affirm and reaffirm that this is a religious nation .... If we pass beyond these
matters to a view of American life, as expressed by its laws, its business, its customs and
its society, we find every where a clear recognition of the same truth. Among other
matters note the following: The form of oath universally prevailing, concluding with an
appeal to the Almighty; the custom of opening sessions of all deliberative bodies and
most conventions with prayer; the prefatory words of all wills, 'In the name of God,
amen;' the laws respecting the observance of the Sabbath, with the general cessation of
all secular business, and the closing of courts, legislatures, and other similar public
assemblies on that day; the churches and church organizations which abound in every
city, town and hamlet; the multitude of charitable organizations existing everywhere
under Christian auspices; the gigantic missionary associations, with general support,
and aiming to establish Christian missions in every quarter of the globe. These, and
many other matters which might be noticed, add a volume of unofficial declarations to
the mass of organic utterances that this is a Christian nation. In the face of all these,
shall it be believed that a [C]ongress of the United States intended to make it a
misdemeanor for a church of this country to contract for the services of a Christian
minister residing in another nation?"). See id. (also reviewing at length state
constitutions, U.S. Constitution, government oaths of office and other indicia of the
importance of Christianity and religion in American life).
137 For example, the Supreme Court recently exempted religious gatherings from the
public health-prompted restrictions otherwise applicable to gatherings of more than a specified
number of persons. See Roman Catholic Diocese v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 65, 68-69 (2020). There
has not been a similarly successful secular challenge even though the First Amendment
presumably accords non-religious gatherings freedom of expression on a par with freedom to
worship. In addition, many jurisdictions as a matter of legislative decree or regulatory
enforcement have permitted religious exceptions to COVID-related restrictions on assembly. See
Virginia Villa, Most States Have Religious Exemptions to COVD-19 Social Distancing Rules,
PEW RES. CTR (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/04/27/most-states-
have-religious-exemptions-to-covid-19-social-distancing-rules/ [https-/perma.cc/YG2A-7A27];
see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (permitting Amish parents to avoid state
mandatory education requirements).
138 See Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 463-64 ("No one reading such a title would suppose
that [C]ongress had in its mind any purpose of staying the coming into this country of
ministers of the gospel, or, indeed, of any class whose toil is that of the brain .... It was never
suggested that we had in this country a surplus of brain toilers, and, least of all, that the
market for the services of Christian ministers was depressed by foreign competition. Those
were matters to which the attention of [C]ongress, or of the people, was not directed.").
432 [Vol. 86:2
ADDING CONTEXT AND CONSTRAINT
In addition, although subsequent legislative history may
be viewed as suspect or even out-of-bounds, it bears mentioning
that in 1891 Congress amended the law by adding to the
exceptions of its reach "ministers of any religious denomination"
as well as "persons belonging to any recognized profession," and
"professors for colleges and seminaries."139 Absent a radical
change in the composition and orientation of Congress, it seems
likely that these amendments were merely clarifying the
original intent of the statute rather than making a policy
decision to add new exceptions.
Holy Trinity Church is thus well supported by contextual
information with no apparent contradictory contextual evidence.
Because of the array of corpora used by Gales & Solan, one might
even go so far as to characterize the word usage data marshalled
to assess Holy Trinity Church as "contextual" data as much at it
is "textual" data in that it examines word use in a variety of
settings.140 One might even characterize corpus linguistics and
related data collection and analysis as contextual.
CONCLUSION: IMPROVING CORPUS LINGUISTICS BY AVOIDING
ISOLATION
Corpus linguistics and related data analysis of word
usage naturally focuses more on text than does other contextual
information such as the background, purpose, or drafting history
of documentary text. But that does not negate the contextual
nature of corpus linguistics analysis. The assembly of so many
examples of word usage in different settings is part of what can
make a corpus a significant improvement over a dictionary.
To be sure, corpora are amalgamations of text-but what
makes corpora useful is not only the digital searchability of the text
but also the information provided in the corpora regarding the
circumstances in which the word is used and the connotation of
word meaning in various settings. Although not providing
background and context regarding the documents at issue in
litigation, corpus linguists provides context about word usage. If
word use context is germane to interpretation, context more
specific to the document at issue in a case must by germane as well.
Corpus linguistics presents a useful advance for legal
interpretation. But usefulness does not make the method a
foolproof exclusive route to sound decision-making.141 Examining
139 See Gales & Solan, supra note 125, at 494.
140 See id. at 505-33.
141 A limitation recognized by legal corpus linguists. See Mouritsen, supra note
4, at 1970 ("The corpus method is not a panacea. The use of corpus data will not do away
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only a few cases, some of which have been subjected to extensive
textual analysis, strongly suggests that better judicial decisions-
e.g., Holy Trinity Church and Continental Can-accord with
contextual indicia of meaning42 while less satisfying decisions-
e.g., Locke, cases permitting snap removal, Muscarello-are those
overly preoccupied by text to the exclusion of other consideration.
A more data-driven analysis of text might have rescued
the Muscarello majority from embarrassment, but its real failing
was insufficient concern for the role of the rule of lenity. And in
Locke and cases permitting snap removal, computerized
assessment of word usage would not be able to rescue
relentlessly literal textualist judges from themselves.
To the extent corpus linguistics is promoted as a means
of making textualism sufficiently scientific to justify resistance
to considering context, its potential becomes peril. If corpus
linguistics is not adequately constrained by intellectual modesty
and supplemented by consideration of context, its potential
remains unrealized, or perhaps even destructive.
with disagreements as to the meaning of statutory terms. Instead, the corpus method
removes the determination of ordinary meaning from the black box of the judge's mental
impression and renders the discussion of ordinary meaning one of tangible and
quantifiable reality."). My amendment to this concession would include a further
concession that disagreements as to meaning should be addressed by consideration of
contextual information as well as improved textual analysis.
142 Or are, like Lachs v. Fidelity & Cas. Co, supported by strong non-textual
considerations relevant to the subject matter of the dispute or other legal doctrine
bearing on the dispute.
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